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Recovering the Legal History of the 
Confederacy 
G. Edward White∗ 
Abstract 
Although the government of the Confederate States of America has 
been formally treated as a legal nullity since 1878, from February, 1861 to 
April, 1865 the Confederacy was a real government, with a Constitution, a 
Congress, district courts, and administrative offices.  This Article seeks to 
recover the legal order of the Confederacy in its robust state, before the 
prospect of its obliteration came to pass. 
The Article explores the question why certain southern states would 
have considered seceding from the United States, and forming a separate 
nation, in late 1860 and early 1861.  It then turns to the legal order of the 
Confederacy that was erected after secession.  It focuses on two 
characteristics of that legal order:  its architecture, including the drafting 
of the Confederate Constitution, the establishment of Confederate district 
courts, and the failure of the Confederate Congress to organize a Supreme 
Court for the Confederacy; and the central legal issues with which the 
Confederate government was preoccupied.  The Article concludes that in 
the minds of contemporaries, the outcome of the Civil War and the 
dissolution of the Confederacy that accompanied it represented a 
transformative phase in American history, in which the way of life that the 
Confederacy symbolized was confined to oblivion. 
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I.  Introduction 
In June 1867, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase issued an opinion in 
Shortridge v. Macon,1 where the plaintiff, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued 
the defendant, a citizen of North Carolina, to collect on a promissory note 
given by the defendant in 1860.2  The defendant stated that under the 
Sequestration Act of August 30, 1861, passed by the Congress of the 
Confederate States of America, he was compelled to pay the value of that 
note into the Confederate Treasury.3  His defense raised the question of 
whether the courts of the United States were bound to recognize the laws of 
the Confederate government.4  Chase held that they were not.5  Those laws 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Shortridge v. Macon, 2 AM. L. REV. 95, 99 (C.C.D.N.C. 1868) (holding that 
"compulsory payment under the [Sequestration Act of August 30, 1861] to the rebel receiver 
of the debt due to the plaintiffs from the defendant was no discharge"). 
 2. See id. ("This is an action for the recovery of the amount of a promissory note, 
with interest. . . .  It is admitted, that the plaintiffs were citizens of Pennsylvania; that the 
defendant was a citizen of North Carolina . . . .").  
 3. See id. (outlining Defendant’s argument that the Confederacy, while it existed, was 
a legitimate government and that the Sequestration Act of August 30, 1861 was valid when it 
was passed). 
 4. See id. at 95–96 (arguing that because after the American Revolution state courts 
recognized colonial acts of sequestration against those hostile to the colonies, courts, 
following the Civil War, should recognize similar actions taken by the Confederacy). 
 5. See id. at 98 ("[N]othing . . . gives countenance to the doctrine . . . that the 
insurgent [s]tates, by the act of rebellion and by levying war against the nation, became 
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were to be treated as having no effect because the Confederacy had no legal 
status that United States courts were obliged to respect.6  The United States, 
Chase wrote, had never "admitted the existence of any government de facto, 
hostile to itself within the boundaries of the Union."7  He went on to say: 
Those who engage in rebellion must expect the consequences.  If they 
succeed, rebellion becomes revolution; and the new government will 
justify its founders.  If they fail, all their acts hostile to the rightful 
government are violations of law, and originate no rights which can be 
recognized by the courts of the nation whose authority and existence 
have been alike assailed.8 
In Williams v. Bruffy,9 the Supreme Court of the United States 
reaffirmed that position.10  Justice Stephen Field wrote that the government 
of the Confederate States of America was "simply the military 
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United 
States."11 When the Confederacy’s "military forces were overthrown," Field 
maintained, "it utterly perished, and with it all its enactments."12  
Recovering the legal order of the Confederate States of America is 
reminiscent of transforming a ghost into human shape. 
Regardless of the official postwar legal status of the Confederacy, 
from its formation in February 1861 to its demise in April 1865, it was a 
real government with a Constitution,13 a Congress,14 district courts,15 and 
administrative offices.16  Those who created the Confederate States of 
                                                                                                                 
foreign [s]tates . . . ."). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 99. 
 9. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 192 (1878) (holding there was "no validity in 
any legislation of the Confederate States which this Court can recognize"). 
 10. See id. ("The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds 
of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws."). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 191–92. 
 13. See generally CONFED. CONST. OF 1861. 
 14. See id. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in a 
Congress of the Confederate States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives."). 
 15. See WARREN MOISE, REBELLION IN THE TEMPLE OF JUSTICE:  THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE COURTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 3 (2003) ("Soon 
after secession, the Confederate States Congress created federal courts . . . ."). 
 16. See id. (describing how the Confederate States Congress created a department of 
justice). 
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America believed that it would eventually thrive as an independent nation, 
and many, at the moment of creation, believed that the independence of the 
Confederacy would be secured without armed resistance from the United 
States.17  They were wrong, of course:  The Confederacy lost the war; its 
member states were absorbed back into the Union; and it became a formal 
legal nullity.18  For more than four years, however, it was a functioning, and 
sometimes thriving, legal order.19  This Article seeks to recover the legal 
order of the Confederacy in its robust state, before the prospect of its 
obliteration came to pass. 
The Article begins by raising the question why certain southern states 
would have considered seceding from the United States in late 1860 and 
early 1861.  It reviews several factors that combined to precipitate that 
decision, including the widespread perception among Southerners that after 
the election of Lincoln and the Republican party in November 1860, that 
they were about to be "subjugated" by a political majority with an 
antislavery agenda; that secession from the Union was constitutional; that 
few adverse military or political consequences would follow from 
secession; and, finally, that after secession the confiscation of federal 
property in the South could be accomplished peacefully.  The Article 
postulates that secession is best understood as an emotional and precipitate 
response by Southerners who did not fully think through its consequences. 
Next, the Article turns to the legal order of the Confederacy that was 
erected after secession.  It focuses on two characteristics of that legal order:  
(1) its architecture, including the drafting of the Confederate Constitution, 
the establishment of Confederate district courts, and the failure of the 
Confederate Congress to organize a Supreme Court for the Confederacy; 
and (2) the central legal issues with which the Confederate government was 
preoccupied—the imposition of martial law, the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus, and conscription of soldiers—all of which were directly 
connected to the war effort.  The Article concludes that, in the minds of 
contemporaries, the outcome of the war and the dissolution of the 
Confederacy that accompanied it represented a transformative phase in 
American history.  With the South’s defeat in the war, the links between the 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM:  THE CIVIL WAR ERA 9 
(1988) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY] (noting that it became common in the winter 
of 1861 to say that "a lady’s thimble will hold all the blood that will be shed" over secession 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 18. Supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 19. See generally MOISE, supra note 15 (describing the functioning of the federal and 
state court systems in South Carolina during the Civil War). 
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way of life that the Confederacy symbolized and the future of America 
were severed, and that way of life was not merely confined to the American 
past, but to oblivion. 
II.  Toward Secession 
An abiding puzzle for anyone reviewing the course of American 
history is why, after the election of a Republican president in 1860, 
residents of a substantial portion of the United States concluded that they 
would be better off outside the existing union of states than within it.  The 
conspicuous success of the American nation since its late eighteenth-
century founding only accentuates the puzzle.  Between 1776 and 1860, the 
United States secured its independence in a war against Great Britain; 
ratified a federal constitution that created enduring republican institutions 
of government; confirmed its control of the American continent in another 
war with the British and in acquisitions of vast chunks of land stretching 
from the Appalachian mountains to the Pacific Coast; gained still more 
western lands in a successful war with Mexico; saw its population increase 
dramatically; and established itself as an international commercial and 
diplomatic presence.20  The abundance of natural resources on the 
American continent dwarfed those afforded to residents of most other world 
nations in the first half of the nineteenth century.21  In that geographical, 
political, and economic setting, the average white male American’s ability 
to affect the form and substance of his government, to increase his 
economic prosperity, and to pursue his happiness free from the oversights 
of officialdom marked him as a singularly favored citizen on the world 
stage.22  
So why, in the last months of 1860 and the early ones of 1861, did 
representatives of southern states choose to transfer their allegiance from a 
nation with that track record of success to a confederacy whose form was 
hastily conceived, whose military and economic prospects were far from 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:  1492 
TO PRESENT (2003). 
 21. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 9 (explaining that even as 
America’s population boomed in the mid-nineteenth century, the "ratio of land to people was 
much greater than in Europe"). 
 22. See id. at 28 ("Americans in the mid-nineteenth century could point to plenty of 
examples . . . of . . . men who by dint of industry, prudence, perseverance, and good 
economy had risen to . . . affluence.  With . . . Abraham Lincoln[’s election] they could point 
to one who had risen from a log cabin to the White House."). 
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assured, and whose future was at best unknown?  By 1860, a generation of 
southern Americans had come to conclude that the benefits enjoyed by 
American citizens at large were no longer likely to be afforded to them if 
they remained participants in the Union, and that those benefits might well 
accrue to them as members of a new southern American republic.23  A 
starting place for understanding how they might have reached that 
conclusion comes in a rehearsal of some themes that had served to define 
American culture in the eighty-odd years between independence and 
Gettysburg, and which had combined, by the middle of the nineteenth 
century, to create an atmosphere of deep sectional antagonism.  
A.  The Emergence of Sectional Antagonism 
Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two 
defining features of American civilization had emerged.24  One was the 
continuous displacement of Amerindian tribes from land they once 
occupied.25  That displacement extended over a vast area from the 
northernmost to the southernmost regions of the Atlantic coast beyond the 
Appalachian mountains.26  As tribes withdrew from or were driven from 
lands in that area, European settlers occupied those lands and established 
agricultural households, ranging from small farms to large plantations.27  
By the opening of the eighteenth century, it was clear that this process of 
tribal displacement would extend past the Appalachians to the regions 
adjacent to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.28  
                                                                                                                 
 23. See, e.g., CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION 12 (2001) (highlighting 
southern fears that "[c]onstitutional protections would become nothing . . . in the treacherous 
hands of Republican[s], whose avowed purpose [was] to subject . . . [Southerners], not only 
to the loss of property but the destruction of [themselves], [their] wives and . . . children, and 
the desolation of [their] homes, . . . alters, and . . . firesides" (internal quotations omitted)). 
 24. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 45 (noting that, as a result 
of continuous forced removals, by 1850, only a few thousand Native Americans remained 
west of the Mississippi River). 
 25. See, e.g., PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 1 (1968) 
(noting that despite the Proclamation of 1763, which ordered a halt to all settlement west of 
the Appalachians, rival colonies continued to push into these regions in a furious pursuit of 
western land). 
 26. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 42 ("By the 1840s [the 
West] had become a farming frontier."). 
 27. HERBERT A. APPLEBAUM, COLONIAL AMERICANS AT WORK 58 (1996) ("[T]he 
seventeenth century was the age of the . . . small farmer. . . .  [O]nly one in four [farmers] 
were large planters."). 
 28. See GATES, supra note 25, at 59 (explaining how the weak central government 
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As settlers with European ancestors moved west to occupy tribal lands, 
they were accompanied, in southern regions, by African-American slaves.29  
The importation of African slavery had been the second defining feature of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America.30  The owners of staple-crop 
plantations relied heavily upon African slave labor in areas where the 
cultivation of crops such as tobacco, rice, and indigo was made possible by 
climatic conditions.31  Plantations dedicated to producing yearly crops of 
those articles and selling their crops to European markets had become a 
model of agricultural householding in the American Coastal South.32  At the 
base of the model was the use of African slaves to harvest crops and 
perform a variety of other household tasks.33  
In the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the United States 
acquired a vast amount of new territory, encompassing all of the area that 
now composes the transcontinental United States.34  Much of that territory 
was acquired by purchase from Spain, France, and Great Britain, but a large 
chunk came from the Mexican Cession, a spoil of the Mexican War.35  The 
acquisition of those "public lands," as they were termed, doubled the size of 
the American nation.36 
                                                                                                                 
under the Articles of Confederation was unable to prevent westward expansion into these 
regions). 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 81 ("By 1830 there were 20,000 persons of American birth with 
their 1,000 slaves in Texas."). 
 30. See JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE:  A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 
12–13 (1982) (noting that the last half of the eighteenth century was a "boom" time for the 
slave trade, as "slave trading was one of the planters’ most profitable and widely practiced 
enterprises"). 
 31. See id. at 39 (noting that by the mid-nineteenth century the South had become so 
dependent on slave labor that in one generation the number of slaveholders increased by 
seventy-three percent). 
 32. See id. at 17 (noting that when Georgia prohibited slavery early in its history, it 
could not compete in the southern agricultural economy as its neighbors were booming 
under the plantation system).  Eventually, economic pressures forced Georgia to relent and 
accept slavery.  Id. 
 33. See id. at 152 (noting that southern plantations were run according to "Plantation 
Management Theory," where plantations were run as bureaucracies, with the landowner 
overseeing management, who in turn controlled every aspect of the slaves’ lives with 
extensive rules and regulations). 
 34. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 9 (explaining that between the 
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and the mid-nineteenth century, American settlers had expanded 
to the Pacific Coast). 
 35. See GATES, supra note 25, at 75–83 (outlining Great Britain’s land cessions in 
1783 and 1818, the purchase of Louisiana from France, and the acquisition of Florida from 
Spain and Texas from Mexico). 
 36. See id. at 86 (noting that between 1803 and 1848, the United States added 
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Here was a huge new mass of land for settlers to occupy, although 
much of it was populated by Amerindian tribes, and its vastness and aridity 
posed formidable challenges for settlement.37  Early nineteenth-century 
developments in the transportation sector, however, would eventually 
enable the regions of the upper Midwest, the Southwest, and the far West to 
become populated.38  The advent of turnpikes, canals, and railroads 
facilitated the westward movement of population, and cities, most of them 
adjacent to rivers or railroad lines, sprang up in the trans-Mississippi 
West.39  
The opening up of western public lands, and the ability of populations 
to move easily from east to west, had a dramatic effect on both the 
displacement of Amerindian tribes and the proliferation of plantation-style 
agriculture.  As public lands were acquired in the lower South, and states 
such as Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas entered the 
Union, slaveholding settlers poured into those states, displacing tribes in the 
process.40  The invention of the cotton gin resulted in the introduction of 
another staple crop that could be grown in warm regions and required 
intensive labor to be processed.41  Generations of African-American slaves, 
born in the United States, accompanied their owners over the Appalachians 
into regions where cotton could be grown.42  The world-wide demand for 
                                                                                                                 
approximately 1.2 billion acres to its original approximate 1 billion acres of land). 
 37. See W. B. Hazen, The Great Middle Region of the United States, and Its Limited 
Space of Arable Land, 120 N. AM. REV. 1, 3 (1875) (noting that the vast area westward of 
the 100th meridian is "a dry broken, and barren country, with very little timber, except 
thorny bushes, and, from lack of moisture, unfit for agriculture"). 
 38. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 12 ("Springing from the 
prairie . . . , Chicago became the terminus for fifteen rail lines by 1860, its population having 
grown by 375 percent during the [1850s]."). 
 39. See id. ("Towns bypassed by the [railroad] shriveled; those located on the iron 
boomed, especially if they also enjoyed water transport."). 
 40. See Parke Pierson, Seeds of Conflict, AM.’S CIVIL WAR, Sept. 2009, at 25, 25 
(explaining that advancements in transportation and the availability of the cotton gin 
"brought enormous changes to the South. Southerners eager to take part in the cotton boom 
began to move west to cultivate new lands, and the white and slave populations of 
Mississippi and Alabama soared").  "One of President Andrew Jackson’s motives for 
moving Native Americans out of the Southeast was to open up land for more cotton 
plantations."  Id. 
 41. See, e.g., id. ("[A]s cotton growth flourished, so did the South’s dependence on 
slavery and the plantation system as the bulwarks of its economy."). 
 42. See DANIEL W. HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848 130 (2007) ("For African Americans, the move [westward] across the 
mountains constituted a second great disruption in the generation following the end of forced 
migration across the ocean."). 
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clothing made from cotton revived plantation agriculture based on slave 
labor.43  Rather than being confined to a comparatively small number of 
southern states along the Atlantic coast, slavery, after the 1830s, seemed 
yoked to westward expansion.44  
By the 1850s, the continuing displacement of Amerindian tribes from 
southern lands suitable for planting labor-intensive staple crops had allowed 
an economy built on African-American slave labor to expand and flourish, 
so that by the 1850s the future of slavery in America no longer seemed 
precarious.45  That same displacement of tribes from northern regions 
resulted in the availability of tracts of inexpensive land in those regions, but 
the unsuitability of much of that land for staple crop production, and the 
consequent diversity of northern occupational pursuits, meant that 
indentured servitude, apprenticeship, and wage labor, rather than slavery, 
became the forms of labor in northern economies.46  Consequently the 
massive entrepreneurial ventures of the first half of the nineteenth century, 
which took place along east-west axes and opened up the interior of the 
continent, affected the wage labor states more than the slave states.47  
Developments in transportation increased the population of wage labor 
states and diversified their economies.48  The same developments in slave 
states, however, served to reinforce the ubiquity of staple-crop plantation 
agriculture featuring labor-intensive work by slaves.49  Sections of the 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See id. at 128 ("In response to an apparently insatiable demand for textiles, U.S. 
cotton production soared . . . ."). 
 44. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 41 (noting that the issue of 
expansion of slavery into the West in the 1840s accentuated the divide between the North 
and South as the North recognized how reliant the South had become on cotton and slave 
labor, and that the western expansion of cotton cultivation was irreversible). 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 162 (noting that following President Buchanan’s election in 1857, 
one Southerner remarked, "we may yet live free men under the Stars and Stripes"). 
 46. See id. at 13–14 (noting how the industrialization of the North revolutionized the 
northern workforce). 
 47. See, e.g., id. at 91 (noting the disparity in northern and southern industrial and 
transportation development in the 1840s and 1850s). 
 48. See id. (noting "[d]uring the [1840s], population growth had been 20 percent 
greater in the free states than in the slave states" because transportation and industrialization 
in the North increased the economic opportunities in the North). 
 49. See id. at 91–92 (noting that as the North raced ahead in industrial development, 
the South, ever dependent on its staple crops, became more and more dependent on northern 
business).  "Some 15 or 20 percent of the price of raw cotton went to ‘factors’ who arranged 
credit, insurance, warehousing, and shipping for planters."  Id. at 92.  "Most of these factors 
represented northern . . . firms."  Id. 
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nation became surrogates not just for different economies but for different 
forms of social organization.50 
As northern and southern, wage labor and slave labor, antislavery and 
proslavery regions emerged in the nineteenth century, their representatives 
formed political blocs, and sectional tensions emanating from the issues of 
slavery and westward expansion dominated the landscape of American 
governance.51  The delicate balance struck by the Constitution’s framers 
between a federal union of enumerated powers and states holding reserved 
powers, between the "inalienable" rights of liberty and property, and 
between a fragile republic of modest size and the prospect of that republic’s 
expanding and prospering on a grand scale became placed under pressure.52  
The principles of sovereignty that guided the founding generation had to 
adjust to massive territorial expansion, the continual growth of the 
American population, and the increasingly sectional cast of nineteenth 
century American life.53  One by one the central institutions of American 
government and politics—the presidency, Congress, the Supreme Court, 
and the national political parties—tried to adjust the framework of 
American governance to contain or defuse sectional tension arising from 
the interaction of slavery with population growth and westward territorial 
expansion.  One by one, they failed.54  
                                                                                                                 
 50. See id. at 39–40 ("[B]y the 1850s Americans on both sides of the line separating 
freedom from slavery came to emphasize more their differences than similarities.  Yankees 
and Southrons spoke the same language, to be sure, but they increasingly used these words 
to revile each other."). 
 51. See id. at 41 ("So long as the slavery controversy focused on the morality of the 
institution where it already existed, the two-party system managed to contain the passions it 
aroused.  But when in the 1840s the controversy began to focus on the expansion of slavery 
into new territories it became irrepressible."). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 78–91 (highlighting the chaos and tension between the North and 
South on the matter of fugitive slave laws).  "In the typical oblique language of the 
Constitution of slavery, Article IV, Section 2 stipulated that any ‘person held to service or 
labor in one state’ who escaped to another ‘shall be delivered up on a claim of the party to 
whom such service or labor shall be due.’"  Id. at 78.  As the Constitution was silent on how 
this command should be enforced, fugitive slave laws created tremendous tension between 
the North and South.  Id.  The North responded to fugitive slave laws with personal liberty 
laws that "imposed criminal penalties for kidnapping."  Id. at 79.  After Pennsylvania 
convicted a man for kidnapping and returning a slave to his master in Maryland, the 
Supreme Court declared Pennsylvania’s anti-kidnapping law unconstitutional while 
upholding fugitive slave laws.  Id. at 79. 
 53. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (noting the population boom of the mid-
nineteenth century); supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting that during the eighteenth 
century, the United States’s land territory more than doubled); supra note 50 and 
accompanying text (highlighting the cultural tensions between the North and the South). 
 54. See, e.g., MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 119 (noting that President 
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For three decades after 1830, Congress employed several strategies to 
respond to the potentially divisive effects of slavery.  One was to adopt a 
"gag" rule prohibiting discussion of the issue;55 another was to precisely 
calibrate the balance between slave and free states in the Union, so that 
each new free state that entered would be accompanied by a new slave 
state;56 another was the Compromise of 1850, legislation that demarcated a 
line between slave and free territory in the trans-Mississippi West and 
strengthened the enforcement of a federal fugitive slave law in free states;57 
yet another was the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which replaced a demarcation 
line between free and slave territory with the principle of "popular 
sovereignty," in which the residents of a federal territory entering the Union 
decided among themselves whether to be a free or slave state.58 None of the 
strategies endured, and the last resulted in the formation of two 
constitutions in the State of Kansas, one imposing and the other abolishing 
slavery, and bloodshed among the residents of the state.59 
While Congress pursued those strategies, a succession of presidents, 
from Jackson through Buchanan, consistently declined to involve 
                                                                                                                 
Pierce vigorously enforced Congress’s fugitive slave laws—which the Supreme Court had 
blessed—at "great cost to domestic tranquility, to the structure of the Democratic party, and 
ultimately to the Union itself"). 
 55. See, e.g., WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING ABOUT SLAVERY 210 (1996) ("The gag 
rule . . . passed easily [in the House] . . . with votes of Northern and Southern Democrats and 
many Whigs from the South . . . .  No more petitions on the subject of slavery!  No more 
scuffles over the petitions!"). 
 56. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 8 (explaining that the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820 was Congress’s attempt to settle the issue of slavery west of the 
Mississippi River).  The Missouri Compromise tried to solve the problem of slavery in the 
West by splitting the Louisiana Purchase at the latitude of 36 degrees 30 minutes.  Id.  
Consequently, slavery was prohibited north of the 36 degrees 30 minutes parallel, except for 
in Missouri, where slavery was allowed.  Id. 
 57. See id. at 71 ("The Compromise of 1850 undoubtedly averted a grave crisis.  But 
hindsight makes clear that it only postponed the trauma.").  The Compromise of 1850 
provided for the admission of California as a free state, a prohibition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia, $10 million for Texas to settle its border dispute with New Mexico, a 
strengthening of the fugitive slave laws, and organization of Utah and New Mexico as 
territories without restrictions on slavery.  Id. at 75. 
 58. See id. at 123 (explaining that the Kansas-Nebraska Act repealed the Missouri 
Compromise and allowed western states to decide for themselves the legality of slavery 
within their borders).  The Kansas-Nebraska Act "may have been the most important single 
event pushing the nation towards civil war."  Id. at 121. 
 59. See id. at 153 (noting that in Kansas, the fight over slavery devolved into a 
"bushwacking war").  The physical unrest was accompanied by political unrest as Kansas’s 
constitutional convention resulted in both a "Constitution with Slavery" and a "Constitution 
with no Slavery."  Id. at 165. 
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themselves with the issue of slavery, taking the position that it was a matter 
of state law.60  At the same time it was acknowledged that Congress could 
outlaw slavery in federal territories, which it had done since the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1789.61  In 1857, however, the Supreme Court found itself 
drawn into the question of slavery in the federal territories in the Dred Scott 
case,62 and appeared to hold, if the opinion of Chief Justice Taney was 
taken as the opinion of the Court, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment precluded Congress from abolishing slavery in the territories.63  
The Dred Scott case suggested that slavery could accompany the initial 
stage of westward expansion in all the federal territory that stretched from 
the Mississippi River to the Pacific coast.64 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See, e.g., JAMES H. BAKER, JAMES BUCHANAN 83 (2004) (noting that President 
Buchanan referred to slavery as "a ‘domestic institution’ under the control of the states"); 
EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER:  THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 38 (2006) (noting that 
President Tyler advocated for the admission of new states as slave states so that slavery 
would become diffuse throughout the Union and would wither out at the state level); JOHN S. 
D. EISENHOWER, ZACHARY TAYLOR 99 (2008) (noting that while Taylor wanted to limit 
slavery in the territories, he had no intention of disturbing the institution in the South); 
MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 62 (noting that while President Van Buren 
acknowledged slavery could be prohibited in federal territories, he preferred to leave the 
issue of slavery in the states to the states); id. at 52 (noting that President Polk refused to 
consider the issue of slavery in California because he did not think slavery in the West was a 
federal concern); id. at 74–75 (noting that President Fillmore supported the Southern 
sentiment that new territories be admitted without restrictions on slavery so each new state 
could decide the slavery question for themselves); JOHN MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION:  
ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 303 (2008) ("Jackson may have opposed states’ 
rights when it came to nullification, but on slavery . . . he was not interested in reform."); 
ROY FRANKLIN NICHOLS, FRANKLIN PIERCE:  YOUNG HICKORY OF THE GRANITE HILLS 432 
(1958) (noting that President Pierce believed "the government had been founded on the 
principle of mutual concession and recognition of the reserved rights of the states" and "this 
principle was in danger of being overthrown under the guise of social reform by the North"); 
ROBERT M. OWENS, MR. JEFFERSON’S HAMMER:  WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY 68–69 (2007) (noting that while governor of the 
Illinois Territory, Harrison, who felt it was up to each territory to decide the question of 
slavery, lobbied Congress to lift the Northwest Ordinance of 1787’s prohibition on slavery in 
the territory). 
 61. See, e.g., HOWE, supra note 42, at 136 (noting that under the Articles of 
Confederation government, Congress prohibited slavery in the lands north of the Ohio River 
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787). 
 62. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857) (suggesting that Congress 
could not prohibit the expansion of slavery into the western territories without running afoul 
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. ("An act of Congress which deprives a citizen . . . of property, merely because 
he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States . . . 
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.").  All the Justices on the 
Taney Court wrote separate opinions in Dred Scott, and only Taney’s opinion explicitly 
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Notwithstanding Dred Scott, the Republican party platform in the 1860 
presidential election endorsed the abolition of slavery in the federal 
territories, and the election was widely perceived as a contest between an 
antislavery North and a proslavery South.65  Abraham Lincoln, the 
Republican candidate, carried all eighteen free states, giving him a decisive 
majority in the electoral college.66  Although Lincoln had repeatedly said 
that he would not interfere with slavery in the South, Southerners believed 
that if slavery were excluded from the federal territories, population trends 
would ensure that slave states would be a permanent minority in both 
Congress and the electoral college.67  Representatives of the Mississippi 
legislature, two months after Lincoln’s election, declared that "utter 
subjugation awaits us in the Union, if we should consent longer to remain in 
it.  We must either submit to degradation and to the loss of property worth 
four billions of money, or we must secede from the Union."68  And 
members of the South Carolina legislature stated that with Lincoln’s 
election "the South shall be excluded from the common territory . . . and a 
war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United 
States."69 
                                                                                                                 
addressed the constitutionality of slavery in the federal territories—an issue that was not 
necessary to the case’s disposition.  Nonetheless, Taney’s opinion was described as "the 
opinion of the Court."  See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 333–34 (1978) ("For there can be no doubt 
that Taney’s opinion was accepted as the opinion of the Court . . . ."). 
 65. See REPUBLICAN NATIONAL PLATFORM (1860) ("[W]e deny the authority of 
Congress, of a territorial legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to Slavery 
in any Territory of the United States."). 
 66. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 232 (noting that by sweeping the 
free states, Lincoln was able to amass 180 electoral votes, well surpassing the 152 needed 
for election in 1860). 
 67. See, e.g., DEW, supra note 23, at 24 (noting that just weeks after the election of 
1860, a collection of twenty southern senators and representatives met because they felt 
"[a]ll hope of [political] relief in the Union, through the agency of committees, 
Congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments [were] extinguished"). 
 68. Declaration of Immediate Causes, in JOURNAL OF THE MISSISSIPPI STATE 
CONVENTION 86, 87–88 (1861).  The speeches and correspondence of the state 
commissioners of the original seceding states have been collected and analyzed in Dew’s 
book.  DEW, supra note 23, at 13.  
 69. JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, HELD IN 1860–
1861 330–31 (1861); DEW, supra note 23, at 12. 
480 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2011) 
B.  The Constitutionality of Secession 
The constitutional argument on behalf of secession was very far from 
being a marginal oddity in early- and mid-nineteenth century constitutional 
jurisprudence.70  A "compact" theory of sovereignty, under which the 
Constitution was treated as an agreement among all the states involved in 
forming the Union to convey certain enumerated powers to a federal 
government and reserve the remaining sovereign authority in themselves, 
surfaced as early as the founding generation and had been prominently 
reasserted in the 1820s and 1830s.71  Since no provision of the Constitution 
expressly gave the federal government the power to prevent states from 
dissolving their connections with the Union, the argument ran that they 
retained the sovereign power to do so.72  This was especially self-evident if 
one believed, as many early nineteenth-century Americans did, that the 
primary loyalties of individual citizens were to their states and localities.73  
To be sure, there were some provisions in the Constitution, such as the 
General Welfare and the Necessary and Proper Clauses of Article I, that 
suggested that Congress might have been delegated power to prevent the 
union of states from disintegrating.74  Many of the Court’s important 
decisions during Marshall’s tenure had the effect of construing federal 
power broadly in order to prevent states from engaging in policies that 
might have disintegrating tendencies.75  But those decisions operated 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See, e.g., DEW, supra note 23, at 13 (noting that Jefferson Davis argued secession 
was a fundamental constitutional right that the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined 
as inalienable). 
 71. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–
1835, in 3–4 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE:  HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 489 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1988) ("[T]he Union 
[is] . . . a confederacy of the states based on the consent of the states in their capacity as 
representatives of the people.  State interests could not be bypassed in the name of a nation 
entity directly representative of the people’s will."). 
 72. See, e.g., id. ("Construction of the constitution ought to be strict . . . in all cases 
where the antecedent rights of a state may be drawn in question." (internal quotations 
omitted)).  "[S]tate governments . . . retain every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated 
to the United States."  Id. 
 73. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 240 (noting that this loyalty arose 
from the notion that the states existed before the Union). 
 74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide 
for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States . . . ."); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 
18 ("To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the 
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."). 
 75. See White, supra note 71, at 500 (explaining that the Court’s goal was to "read 
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against the same background assumptions as the "compact theory" 
arguments on behalf of "states’ rights":  That the federal government’s 
powers in the Constitution had been carved out of a residuum of state 
power.76 
In an April 29, 1861 message to the Provisional Congress of the 
Confederacy, Jefferson Davis reasserted the idea that the Constitution of 
1789 was "a compact between independent [s]tates," a proposition which he 
found reinforced in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, which "plac[ed] 
beyond any pretense of doubt the reservation by the [s]tates of all their 
sovereign rights and powers not expressly delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution."77  In addition, the law of nations declared that "each 
[s]tate was, in the last resort, the sole judge" of what acts were consistent 
with those sovereign rights.78  Later, Alexander H. Stephens, Davis’s vice 
president, would elaborate on that argument, maintaining that it was "the 
inherent right of Nations" to "disregard the obligations of Compacts of all 
sorts" when "there has been a breach of the Compact by the other party or 
parties."79  Northern states, by refusing to comply with their obligation to 
return fugitive slaves, had breached the compact with the South, justifying 
secession.  
Lincoln rejected this view in his inaugural address, arguing that the 
Articles of Confederation declared that the Union was to be perpetual, and 
the Constitution had been created "to form a more perfect union."80  In 
1869, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase reaffirmed that view in Texas v. 
                                                                                                                 
Article III as a mandate not only for extensive federal judicial power but for an obligatory 
judicial-legislative partnership to extend the authority of the national government" vis-à-vis 
the states). 
 76. See id. at 500–01 (explaining that Justice Story’s opinion in Martin v. Hunter was 
"designed to entrench the proposition that the Constitution had created a federal government 
of potentially wide scope"). 
 77. Jefferson Davis, Message to Congress of the Confederate States of America (Apr. 
29, 1861), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE CONFEDERACY:  INCLUDING THE DIPLOMATIC 
CORRESPONDENCE, 1861–1865 63, 64–65 (James D. Richardson ed., 1905) [hereinafter 
Richardson, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE CONFEDERACY]. 
 78. Id. at 1269. 
 79. 1 ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR BETWEEN 
THE STATES:   ITS CAUSES, CHARACTER, CONDUCT AND RESULTS 496 (1868). 
 80. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 264–65 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) ("[I]n 
contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is 
perpetual.  Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national 
governments.").  
482 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2011) 
White,81 pointing to the Guarantee Clause and preamble of the Constitution 
as evidence that the framers wanted to protect the states in the Union 
"against domestic violence" and to preserve "a more perfect Union."82  
Chase also spoke of the Constitution as creating an "indestructible Union" 
or "indestructible states."83  But those comments were predicated on the 
hypothesis that the Confederate states had never left the Union—the same 
hypothesis that enabled all the decisions of their courts and legislatures to 
be deemed legal nullities.  That hypothesis erected a fiction, and Chase was 
unable to point to any constitutional provision preventing a state from 
seceding.84  To show that the Framers anticipated a permanent Union was 
not the same as showing that they had refused to allow states to withdraw 
from it. 
C.  The Ideology of Secession 
The rapidity of secessionist declarations by southern states after 
Lincoln’s election was remarkable, as was the assembling of the 
Confederate government uniting them.  By February 1, 1861, Mississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas followed South Carolina 
in seceding.85  Between February 4 and 9, a convention of those states met 
in Montgomery, Alabama, and drafted a provisional constitution for the 
Confederate States of America.86  By February 9, 1861, Jefferson Davis of 
Mississippi and Alexander Stephens of Georgia had been elected President 
and Vice-President of the Confederacy.87  In contrast to the decision for 
American independence, which took place more than a year after the 
Continental Congress first convened, or the creation and ratification of the 
Constitution of the United States, which took place slightly less than two 
years after delegates were first assembled in Philadelphia, the Confederacy 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868) ("Texas . . . entered [an] indissoluble 
[Union]. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guaranties of republican 
government in the Union, attached at once to the State. . . .  The union between Texas and 
the other States was as . . . indissoluble as the union between the original States."). 
 82. Id. at 724, 734. 
 83. Id. at 725.  
 84. Id. at 700–36. 
 85. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 235 ("Mississippi [seceded] on 
January 9, 1861, followed by Florida on January 10, Alabama on January 11, Georgia on 
January 19, Louisiana on January 26, and Texas on February 1."). 
 86. Id. at 257. 
 87. Id. at 259. 
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was launched, with a constitution, three months after the news of Lincoln’s 
election reached the South.88  
Part of the swiftness was attributable to the fact that secession came in 
the form of conventions in individual states rather than through the actions 
of a body akin to the Continental Congress.89  Delegates to those 
conventions were elected, but the actions of the conventions were not 
submitted to the people at large for ratification except in Texas, where 
approximately three-fourths of those who voted endorsed secession.90  The 
process of secession faced fewer parliamentary obstacles than had those of 
independence or the creation of the Constitution. 
But it was also clear that the act of secession represented a kind of 
release to Southerners who had become increasingly apprehensive about 
their future.  Many saw secession as a gesture of principled defiance with 
few immediate adverse consequences.  It was widely thought in seceding 
states that the United States government would not forcibly attempt to keep 
them in the Union; secession was regarded as an initial step in an eventually 
cooperative relationship with the states that remained.91  The crowds who 
waved flags and danced in the streets in Charleston, Savannah, New 
Orleans, and Mobile, after their state conventions voted for secession, were 
not anticipating the four years of carnage that would ensue.92 
Supporters of secession frequently compared themselves to the 
Revolutionary War patriots who had resolved to separate themselves from 
Great Britain in order to preserve their liberties.  From Jefferson Davis, who 
called upon Southerners to "renew such sacrifices as our fathers made to the 
holy cause of constitutional liberty,"93 to a Virginia slaveholder, who 
equated remaining in the Union with being "‘deprived of that right for 
which our fathers fought in the battles of the revolution,’"94 to a Virginia 
officer in the Confederate Army, who likened the Union’s "war of 
subjugation against the [S]outh" to "England’s war upon the colonies,"95 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 234. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 235. 
 91. See id. at 238 (noting that Southerners thought "the Yankees were cowards and 
would not fight" (internal quotations omitted)).   
 92. Id. 
 93. Jefferson Davis, Message to Confederate States Congress (Feb. 22, 1862), in 
JEFFERSON DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONALIST:  HIS LETTERS, PAPERS, AND SPEECHES 202 (Dunbar 
Rowland ed., 1923).  
 94. OAKES, supra note 30, at 239. 
 95. Letter from Thomas Rowland (June 14, 1861), in JAMES M. MCPHERSON, WHAT 
THEY FOUGHT FOR:  1861–1865 9 (1994) [hereinafter MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT 
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those who joined the Confederacy thought of secession as a "Holy Cause of 
Liberty and Independence."96  In the late months of 1864, when 
Confederate soldiers suffered increasingly severe hardships, and desertions 
from the Confederate army skyrocketed, letters and diaries of the soldiers 
continued to describe the war as a "gigantic struggle for liberty," a fight 
"against tyranny and oppression," and a crusade "for the dear rights of 
freemen."97 
The emphasis on liberty and independence in the rhetoric of 
secessionists has regularly been described as ironic because the "holy 
cause" for which Southerners seceded and fought was a social and 
economic system predicated on the "rights" of white Southerners to deprive 
black Southerners of their liberties and confine them to a permanent state of 
dependency.  Only occasionally, however, can one find evidence of the 
recognition of these contradictions in the rhetoric of those who supported 
secession or fought for the Confederacy.98  Much more common were 
statements that Southerners would be "subjugated" or "degraded" if a 
northern-dominated federal government were to abolish slavery.99  The 
"liberty" they enjoyed as free white men, capable of owning African-
American slaves, would be taken away.  Those comments demonstrated 
how deeply white Southerners, by the 1850s, had come to view African-
American slavery not only as a symbol of a social hierarchy based on race, 
but as a way of defining what it meant to be free.  Not only could white 
men own slaves, they could not be slaves.  If slavery were abolished, those 
features of whiteness would disappear as well.  No word better captured 
white Southerners’ sense that preserving slavery meant preserving their 
                                                                                                                 
FOR].   
 96. Letter from Henry Orr (Oct. 31, 1861), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT FOR, 
supra note 95, at 9. 
 97. Thomas J. Key, Diary Entry (Aug. 8, 1864), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT 
FOR, supra note 95, at 24–25; Robert Emory Park, Dairy Entry (Dec. 24, 1864), in 
MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 25. 
 98. See Letter from Charles Woodward Hudson (Sept. 14, 1861), in MCPHERSON, 
WHAT THEY FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 51 ("It is insulting to the English common sense 
of race [to say that Confederate soldiers] are battling for an abstract right common to all 
humanity.  Every reflecting child will glance at the darkey who waits on him [and] laugh at 
the idea of such an ‘abstract right.’"). 
 99. See Letter from Thomas J. Goree (Feb. 18, 1982), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY 
FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 12 ("It is better to spend all in defending our country than to 
be subjugated and have it taken away from us."); Letter from Sydney S. Champion (June 1, 
1864), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 25 (expressing that a 
northern victory would amount "to a depth of degredation [sic] immeasurably below that of 
the Helots of Greece"). 
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own freedom than "subjugation."100  Slaveholders and nonslaveholders both 
described the prospect of northern political control of the South as "galling 
in its tyranny,"101 concluding that "[i]t is better to spend our all in defending 
our country than to be subjugated and have it taken away from us."102 
It is thus appropriate to see the conventions that resulted in seven 
states leaving the Union within a six-week period, only a month after 
Lincoln’s election, as markers of released pent-up emotions, producing acts 
whose consequences were not fully anticipated.  It is also appropriate, 
however, to see the declarations of secession as constituting a full 
recognition, by white residents of the seceding states, of how enlisted they 
had become in the institution of slavery.  Alongside the traditional rhetoric 
of American sovereignty debates invoked in official justifications for 
secession, both during and after the event—allusions to "liberty," "states’ 
rights," "consolidation," "tyranny," and other watchwords—there were also 
the particularistic appeals secessionist Southerners made to other 
Southerners whom they hoped to persuade to join them.  In the course of 
addressing a joint session of the Georgia General Assembly on December 
17, 1860, three days before South Carolina seceded, Judge William L. 
Harris, a Mississippi secession commissioner,103 declared that: 
[The Lincoln Black Republicans] are more defiant and more intolerant 
than ever before.  
. . . . 
They . . . now demand equality between the white and negro races, 
under our Constitution; equality in representation, equality in the right 
of suffrage, . . . equality in the social circle, equality in the rights of 
matrimony . . . . 
[T]hey have proclaimed freedom to the slave, but eternal degradation for 
you and for us. 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 12 (noting that 
"[s]ubjugated was the favorite word for the fate worse than death that would face southern 
whites if the Confederacy lost the war"). 
 101. Letter from John Weaton (Jan. 19, 1864), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY FOUGHT 
FOR, supra note 95, at 25. 
 102. Letter from Thomas J. Goree (Feb. 18, 1862), in MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY 
FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 12. 
 103. See DEW, supra note 23, at 18–21 (noting that as momentum for secession grew in 
the South in late 1860 and early 1861, five states—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and South Carolina—appointed "commissioners" to the legislatures of other 
slaveholding states).  Commissioners were instructed to "spread the secessionist message" 
across the South.  Id. at 18. 
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. . . .  
Our fathers made this a government for the white man, rejecting the 
negro, as an ignorant, inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-
government, and not, therefore, entitled to be associated with the white 
man upon terms of civil, political, or social equality.  
This new administration comes to power, under the solemn pledge to 
overturn and strike down this great feature of the Union . . . and to 
substitute in its stead their new theory of the universal equality of the 
black and white races. 
. . . .  
[T]here is but one alternative:   
This new union with Lincoln Black Republicans and free negroes, 
without slavery; or slavery under our old constitutional bond of union, 
without Lincoln Black Republicans, or free negroes either, to molest us.  
If we take the former, then submission to negro equality is our fate. If 
the latter, then secession is inevitable—each State for itself and by itself, 
but with a view to the immediate formation of a Southern 
Confederacy . . . .104 
                                                                                                                 
 104. William L. Harris, Address to the Georgia General Assembly (Dec. 17, 1860), in 
DEW, supra note 23, at 83, 85–87. 
In 1860 President Buchanan tendered to [Harris] a seat upon the bench of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death 
of Mr. Justice Peter V. Daniel of Virginia, but this appointment Judge Harris 
declined in consequence of the approaching and foreseen disruption of the 
Federal Union. He spurned the honors of an office which might place him in an 
attitude of official hostility to measures the adoption of which he foresaw would 
be the only alternative to the degradation of his people. 
JAMES D. LYNCH, THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSISSIPPI 343 (1881). 
The idea that Buchanan would have nominated a justice to the Court with the views 
expressed by Harris is arresting, but there are some reasons to doubt the authenticity of 
Lynch’s statement. Daniel died in May 1860, and Harris would not have been aware of any 
"approaching . . . disruption of the [F]ederal [U]nion" until November 1860 at the earliest, 
and would not have known that on the Court he would have been "in an attitude of hostility" 
to secessionist measures until December 20, when South Carolina seceded.  Id.  Thus, if 
Harris was tendered an offer by Buchanan and declined it for the reasons stated, his 
exchange with Buchanan would have had to take place in the comparatively narrow time 
frame between December 20 and December 31, 1860, which included the Christmas holiday.  
Other contemporary sources discussing Buchanan’s nomination did not mention Harris as a 
candidate, although they did indicate that some candidates from Mississippi were proposed.  
From the outset Buchanan’s candidate for the position seems to have been Jeremiah S. 
Black, who served the Buchanan administration as Attorney General and Secretary of State.  
See CHAUNCEY F. BLACK, ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF JEREMIAH S. BLACK:  WITH A 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 8 (1885) (noting that Black served as Attorney General from 1857 
until 1860 when he replaced Lewis Cass as Secretary of State).   Because Buchanan regarded 
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D.  The Initial Response to Secession 
Galvanized by sentiments such as those expressed by Harris, seven 
states left the Union and assembled the Confederate States of America by 
the middle of February 1861.105  Eight southern states remained in the 
Union, and Buchanan remained in the presidency until March 4.106  In the 
interval between Lincoln’s election and his inauguration, neither the 
Confederacy, Congress, nor the Buchanan administration showed any 
inclination to escalate secession into war.107  It appeared, in fact, as if the 
seceding states might be left undisturbed so long as union sentiments 
prevailed across the rest of the South.108  The gap between secession from 
the Union by seven "cotton" states and civil war seemed a tolerably wide 
one. 
Between February and April 1861 that state of affairs continued in 
place.109  The eight slave states remaining in the Union, all of whom had a 
lower concentration of slaves in their populations than the states that had 
seceded, showed little inclination to embrace secession.110  Legislatures in 
five of those states proposed that delegates be elected to conventions 
considering secession, but conventions were only held in three of those 
                                                                                                                 
Black as valuable in those capacities, he delayed submitting Black’s nomination until 
February 1861, at which point several southern senators inclined to support a Buchanan 
nominee had left the Senate.  See id. at 24 (noting that due "to the previous withdrawals of 
Southern Senators," Black was never confirmed).  Black’s nomination was eventually tabled, 
giving Lincoln the appointment.  Id.  
 105. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 235–36 (noting that by February 
1, 1861, South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas had 
seceded).  
 106. See id. at 236 (noting that Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, 
Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware remained in the Union by the time Lincoln 
was inaugurated on March 4, 1861). 
 107. See id. at 248 (noting that the federal government’s passivity towards the secession 
crisis was due to "lame-duck syndrome").  "During the four-month interval between 
Lincoln’s election and inauguration, Buchanan had the executive power but felt little 
responsibility for the crisis, while Lincoln had responsibility but little power."  Id. 
 108. See id. at 249–50 (noting that President Buchanan believed that if no other states 
joined the original seven in secession, the "disunion fever would run its course and the 
presumed legions of southern unionists would bring the South back to its senses"). 
 109. See id. at 274 (noting that after February 1861, no states left the Union for the 
Confederacy until Virginia seceded on April 15, 1861). 
 110. See id. at 255 (noting that slaves accounted for forty-seven percent of the 
population in the original seven states to secede, while slaves accounted for just twenty-three 
percent of the population in the eight southern states that remained part of the Union through 
February 1861). 
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states, Arkansas, Missouri, and Virginia.111  By April 4, each state had 
rejected secession.112  North Carolina and Tennessee voters declined even 
to hold conventions, the legislatures of Delaware and Kentucky did not 
issue convention proposals, and the governor of Maryland refused to call 
the legislature into session for the purpose of considering a secession 
convention.113 
Meanwhile, Congress directed its activity toward some form of 
compromise with the states that had seceded.114  Buchanan’s last message to 
Congress, delivered on December 3, denied that states had a constitutional 
right to secede, but also conceded that the federal government had no power 
to "coerce" a seceding state to remain.115  It also described secession as one 
of the "natural effects" of "the incessant and violent agitation of the slavery 
question" by the North.116  Buchanan asked northern states to repeal their 
personal liberty laws, which he deemed "unconstitutional and 
obnoxious,"117 to support a constitutional amendment legitimizing the right 
of slave-ownership in all federal territories,118 and to join southern states in 
an effort to acquire Cuba, which could enter the Union as a state with a 
large slave population.119  
Those requests, which in effect asked northern members of Congress 
to support the platforms of southern candidates whom a majority of 
American voters had decisively rejected in the 1860 election, had no chance 
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of being taken up by Congress.120  But other compromise proposals 
surfaced in the lame-duck Congress of 1860–61, which included a few 
members from states that had seceded.121  Special committees were formed 
in both houses to formulate proposals, and eventually five came to 
Congress.122  Two emanating from the House committee, which had thirty-
three members, were eventually passed by both houses.123  One was a 
resolution endorsing the repeal of personal liberty laws inconsistent with 
the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act;124 the other was a proposed Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which prevented the federal government 
from interfering with slavery in the states.125  That amendment actually 
received the two-thirds majority in both houses necessary to send it to the 
states for ratification, although events were shortly to intervene to prevent 
the ratification process from getting under way.126 
Other proposals were designed to make more immediate concessions 
to the slave states remaining in the Union.127  One, originating in the Senate 
committee of thirteen members, was a series of amendments to the 
Constitution designed to be valid in perpetuity.128  They established 
protection for slavery in the states; abolished slavery in territories north of 
36 degrees 30 minutes while retaining it south of that line, including 
subsequently acquired territories; prevented Congress from abolishing 
slavery on federal properties within slave states or in the District of 
Columbia;129 prevented Congress from interfering with the interstate trade 
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of slaves; and established compensation for slaveowners who were 
prevented from recovering their fugitive slaves in northern states.130  
Presented in a package by Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, the 
amendments nearly passed the Senate, being rejected 25-23 on the Senate 
floor.131  All twenty-five Republicans voted against them, and fourteen 
senators from states that had seceded or were contemplating seceding did 
not vote.132 
In addition, Congress agreed to take up the recommendations made by 
a "peace convention" of statesmen, most of whom had retired from public 
office, that the Virginia legislature had created and former president John 
Tyler chaired.133  The delegates to that convention attempted to modify the 
Crittenden compromise package, extending the demarcation line between 
free and slave territory only to "present territory" and requiring a majority 
vote of senators from both free and slave states before the acquisition of 
any future territory.134  Those changes were made to assuage northern 
apprehensions about the future acquisition of Cuba, Mexico, or other 
regions suitable for slavery, but they were not enough to get the peace 
convention’s recommendations through Congress.135 
The compromise proposals signaled that those in the South who 
believed that secession would have no immediate adverse consequences 
had reason for optimism.136  The proposals amounted to a retreat from the 
Republican platform’s categorical stance of not allowing slavery to expand 
beyond its current state base.137  They were also designed to prevent the 
federal government from ever interfering with slavery in states where it was 
already established.138  Only one of them, the "peace convention" proposal, 
could have been said to make concessions to antislavery constituencies, 
either within or outside of Congress.139  The same attitude seemed present 
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in Lincoln’s March 4, 1861, inaugural address.140  In it he repeated his 
pledge not to interfere with slavery where it existed and stated that when "in 
any interior locality" dissatisfaction with the policies of the federal 
government was "so great and so universal, as to prevent competent 
resident citizens from holding the Federal offices," those offices would be 
closed "for the time."141   On the potentially disruptive issue of federal 
property in states that had seceded, much of which had been seized by those 
states, Lincoln said only that the federal government would continue to 
"hold, occupy, and possess" its property, and would "collect the duties and 
imposts" in the states.142  Customs duties and imposts could conceivably be 
collected offshore, and, at the time of Lincoln’s address, only two 
conspicuous federal military posts existed in seceded states:  Fort Pickens, 
in Pensacola Bay off of Florida, and Fort Sumter, on an island in Charleston 
harbor.143  
E.  The Problem of Federal Property in the South:  Fort Sumter 
The status of those federal forts, however, threatened to be 
disruptive.144  Of the two, Fort Sumter, in the range of Confederate guns 
pointing out from Charleston, was potentially the more symbolic.145  It had 
the capacity to mount 146 guns and accommodate 650 soldiers, and when 
fully staffed it posed a formidable threat to any traffic in Charleston 
harbor.146  But at the time South Carolina seceded, the fort was undergoing 
repairs, and the comparatively small number of Union soldiers assigned to 
its garrison were headquartered at nearby Fort Moultrie on the South 
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Carolina mainland.147  After South Carolina’s secession, the state sent 
commissioners to Washington to negotiate a withdrawal of Union troops 
from both Moultrie and Sumter.148   
The Buchanan administration, which favored withdrawing troops but 
did not want to appear as if it were appeasing the Confederacy, promised 
not to reinforce the Union garrison at Charleston but stopped short of 
agreeing to withdraw it.149  While negotiations were taking place, the 
commander at Fort Moultrie, Major Robert Anderson, moved his troops 
from there to Fort Sumter under the cover of darkness, placing the troops in 
a location less easily assailable from the South Carolina mainland.150  When 
public opinion in the North hailed Anderson as a hero and demanded that 
Sumter not be given to South Carolina, Buchanan approved a proposal to 
reinforce the troops now stationed at Sumter.151  A merchant ship was 
dispatched with supplies and 200 men, but its mission became public 
knowledge, and when the ship arrived in Charleston harbor on January 9, 
1861, it was fired on by South Carolina forces and retreated.152  The Union 
soldiers at Sumter were ordered not to fire back.153  The incident initiated a 
truce between South Carolina and the Buchanan administration in which 
Sumter and Fort Pickens were left undisturbed, but no additional efforts to 
reinforce them were made.154  After the Confederacy came into being in 
February, Jefferson Davis sent another set of commissioners to Washington 
to negotiate the withdrawal of Union forces from both Sumter and 
Pickens.155  
There matters stood on March 4, when Lincoln formally assumed the 
presidency.156  The morning after Lincoln’s inauguration he received a 
dispatch from Anderson, indicating that his supplies were running low and 
would be exhausted within six weeks.157  The information set off a series of 
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debates within the Lincoln administration.158  Most of Lincoln’s cabinet 
favored giving up Pickens and Sumter as a gesture of reconciliation to the 
upper south states, and William Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State, made 
independent, unauthorized contact with the Confederate commissioners and 
signaled to them that Sumter and Pickens would be given up to the South.159  
Lincoln, however, mindful of his pledge to "hold, occupy, and possess" 
federal territory in seceded states, resisted withdrawing from either of the 
forts.160  By the middle of March, Lincoln had made the decision to 
reinforce Fort Pickens, but the issue of what to do about Sumter remained 
open.161  By early April, a majority of Lincoln’s cabinet had resolved not to 
give up Sumter, Lincoln had privately reprimanded Seward, and logistical 
plans for reinforcing the forts were conceived.162  
Under the plans, Pickens was to be reinforced secretly with troops as 
well as supplies, but Sumter was to be reinforced publicly.163  The 
reinforcement of Sumter was to take place by troop transports, escorted by 
Union warships, which would station themselves at a sandbar in the 
Atlantic near the mouth of Charleston harbor.164  Tugs and small boats 
would carry only supplies from the transport ships to the garrison at 
Sumter, with the soldier reinforcements remaining on the transports.165  The 
governor of South Carolina would be notified that the Union forces had 
been instructed not to fire unless fired upon, and that only provisions were 
being brought to the fort.166  That message was sent on April 6.167 
Lincoln’s strategy was designed to place the Confederate leaders in a 
dilemma.168  If they allowed Fort Sumter’s reinforcement, they were 
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permitting a potentially powerful Union military presence to remain within 
the state that had led secession.169  If they resisted, they would be using  
military force against federal property and federal troops, an 
unambiguously "warlike" action.170  On April 9, Davis’s cabinet selected 
the latter option.171  They endorsed his order to General Pierre Beauregard, 
the new commander of South Carolina militia forces, to fire on Fort Sumter 
before the federal transports arrived.172  Beauregard first asked Anderson to 
surrender; then, when Anderson rejected the offer, he began firing on 
Sumter in the early morning hours of April 12.173   By April 14, Anderson’s 
garrison had surrendered, and the newly created Confederate flag flew over 
Sumter.174  The next day, Lincoln announced that a rebellion "too powerful 
to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" had taken 
place in South Carolina, and called 75,000 militiamen into the service of the 
Union army "to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our 
National Union."175  The response in the North to Lincoln’s request was so 
favorable that governors from northern states asked the War Department to 
call up more troops from their states than Lincoln had requested.176  
When Lincoln responded to the firing on Sumter by asking for militia 
support from southern as well as northern states, regional consciousness, 
pivoting on the slavery issue, surfaced.177  Alongside the extremely 
enthusiastic responses issuing from the governors of Massachusetts, New 
York, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were statements from those of Virginia, 
North Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas, indicating 
that they would, as the governor of Kentucky put it, "furnish no troops for 
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the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."178  "The 
division," a North Carolina newspaper stated, "must be made on the line of 
slavery.  The South must go with the South."179 
That argument resonated throughout the southern states that had 
remained in the Union.180  Four of those states, Arkansas, North Carolina, 
Virginia, and Tennessee, formally seceded between May 6 and June 8, 
some by referendum, others in conventions.181  A convention in Virginia 
had voted for secession as early as April 17, and Virginia militia seized the 
federal armory at Harper’s Ferry and the navy yard at Gosport the next 
day.182  On April 27, the convention invited the Confederate government to 
transfer its capital from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia, and 
that invitation was accepted on May 21.183  Secession had spread 
throughout the South, and the Confederacy had chosen to define itself as a 
military foe of the Union government.184 
Looking back on the rush of events between November 1860 and April 
1861, one gains the distinct impression that secession was initially viewed 
by its adherents as a gesture of principled defiance:  A declaration that free 
white southern men would not be subjugated by a growing majority of 
abolitionists and Black Republicans.185  One also gains the impression that 
many enthusiasts for secession did not believe that severe consequences 
would follow from it.186  The initial response of the Buchanan 
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administration and Congress seemed to confirm that belief:  It seemed as if 
few members of the Union government were interested in abolishing 
slavery, either now or in the future.187  The federal government had not 
been anything like a massive presence in the South, so few secessionists 
may have anticipated the impasse that would emerge over Fort Sumter.188  
Had those who formed the Confederacy in February 1861 been aware that 
within two months their government would be consumed with fighting the 
largest war in American history, and that conducting that war would be the 
principal activity of that government for all of its existence, they might well 
have deliberated longer before formally seceding from the Union.189  
Secession, in retrospect, was an emotional and impulsive gesture.190 
III.  The Legal Order of the Confederacy 
Because the government of the Confederacy lasted only slightly more 
than four years, and devoted much of its attention to military and 
diplomatic matters, it is difficult to imagine what sort of nation the 
Confederate States of America might have become had its founders 
managed to secure its independence.191  Nonetheless if one reconstructs the 
structure of government contemplated by the framers of the Confederate 
Constitution, paying particular attention to the role of Congress and federal 
courts in the Confederacy, one may be able to gain an impression of the sort 
of independent Confederate nation that its founders contemplated, even if 
that nation never came fully into being. 
A.  The Confederate Constitution 
One reason why the original seven secessionist states were able to 
form a confederated government so quickly was that their delegates, once 
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assembled in convention, adopted the text of the Constitution of the United 
States192 as their template for the Confederacy’s constitution.193  The 
eventual document that became the Constitution of the Confederate States 
of America retained far more of the text of the U.S. Constitution than it 
changed.194  The use of the Constitution as a template for the formal 
organization of the Confederacy is revealing in itself, demonstrating how 
deeply residents of the American South had internalized most of the 
substantive and structural principles set forth in the 1789 Constitution and 
its first twelve Amendments.195  It was as if, on the whole, delegates from 
the secessionist states were satisfied with the government the founding 
generation had created.196 
If the text of the U.S. Constitution in 1804 is compared with that of the 
Confederate Constitution drafted in 1861, it becomes apparent that the 
delegates to the Confederacy’s constitutional convention made relatively 
few changes to the 1804 document.197  Some of those changes, however, 
were highly revealing of the sort of government the delegates envisaged the 
Confederate States of America would become.198  
Although the changes were scattered throughout the text of the 
Confederate Constitution, they were animated by a single overriding 
concern:  The Constitution of the Confederate States of America was to be 
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founded on the principle that states were the primary unit of government.199  
Not only was the sovereignty of the states to prevail over that of any 
confederated government they formed, the rights of individuals were to be 
understood principally as rights possessed by citizens of states.200  Thus, the 
preamble to the Confederate Constitution substituted, for the opening words 
of the U.S. Constitution ("We the People of the United States, in Order to 
form a more perfect Union"),201 the phrase "We, the people of the 
Confederate States, each state in its sovereign and independent character, in 
order to form a permanent Federal Government."202  The version employed 
by the Confederate delegates emphasized the "sovereign and independent 
character" of states and the association of individuals with them, and made 
it clear that the government of the Confederacy was being created out of the 
sovereign power of states.203  
Changes made to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution provided further evidence of the importance of state 
sovereignty to the Confederate drafters.204  Versions of those two 
amendments became clauses of a new Article VI in the Confederate 
Constitution.205  Clause 5 of that article was a modification of the Ninth 
Amendment:  "The enumeration, in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people of the 
several states."206  Clause 6 was a version of the Tenth Amendment:  "The 
powers not delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states, respectively, or to 
the people thereof."207  The addition of the modifying phrases "of the 
several states" in Clause 5 and "thereof" in Clause 6 precluded a possible 
reading of individual citizenship in the Confederacy as existing independent 
of state citizenship, or of the Confederate government as representing a 
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national entity to which individuals might adhere irrespective of their 
association with states.208  
The placement of the other nine amendments to the 1804 Constitution 
also signaled the importance the Confederate drafters attributed to the 
principle of state sovereignty.209  Article I, Section 9 of the Confederate 
Constitution was based on that same Article and Section in the text of the 
U.S. Constitution, which set forth limitations on the powers of Congress.210  
The Confederate drafters retained many of the provisions of Article I, 
Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution intact.211  They added two provisions 
affecting the importation of "negroes of the African race from any foreign 
country other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United 
States" ("hereby forbidden")212 and "the introduction of slaves from any 
State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy" 
("Congress shall . . . have power to prohibit").213  They inserted three 
provisions which attempted to ensure the fiscal propriety of the Confederate 
government while recognizing that it might need to raise money from the 
states from time to time.214  They then listed the first eight amendments to 
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shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be 
taken."), with CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No capitation or other direct tax shall 
be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be 
taken."); compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury 
but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of 
the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."), 
with CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury but 
in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the 
receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."). 
 212. CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
 213. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 214. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 9 ("Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury, 
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the 1789 Constitution verbatim.215  The clear import of placing the Bill of 
Rights Amendments in Article I, Section 9 of the Confederate Constitution 
was to signal that those "rights" were limitations on the powers of the 
Confederate Congress.216  They did not have any impact on the states in the 
Confederacy.217 
The Eleventh Amendment, dealing with the sovereign immunity of 
states, also appeared in the Confederate Constitution.218  It was inserted into 
Article III, setting forth the powers of the courts of the Confederacy.219  In 
Section 2, Clause 1 of that Article, the Confederate drafters took up the 
language in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which conveyed 
jurisdiction on the courts of the United States.220  When they reached the 
                                                                                                                 
except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses . . . unless it be asked and estimated by some 
one of the heads of departments, and submitted to Congress by the President . . . ."); id. 
("Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury . . . unless . . . for the purpose of 
paying its own expenses and contingencies; or for the payment of claims against the 
Confederate States, the justice of which shall have been declared by a tribunal for the 
investigation of claims against the Government . . . ."); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 10 ("All bills 
appropriating money shall specify, in Federal currency, the exact amount of each 
appropriation, and the purposes for which it is made; and Congress shall grant no extra 
compensation to any public contractor officer, agent, or servant, after such contract shall 
have been made, or such service rendered.").  Compare id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No tax or duty 
shall be laid on articles exported from any State, except by a vote of two-thirds of both 
Houses."), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (lacking the "except" language present in the 
Confederate Constitution, this clause states that "[n]o tax or duty shall be laid on articles 
exported from any State").  
 215. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 9, cl. 12–19 (listing verbatim the first eight 
amendments included in the Bill of Rights).  Clause 11 of Article I, Section 9, following the 
text of the 1804 U.S. Constitution, outlawed titles of nobility and prevented federal 
officeholders from accepting "any present, emolument, office or title, of any kind whatever" 
from "any king, prince, or foreign State."  Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 11; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9, cl. 7 ("No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, and no person holding 
any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any 
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince, or foreign 
State."). 
 216. DEROSA, supra note 191, at 78. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). 
 219. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("[N]o state shall be sued by a citizen 
or subject of any foreign State."). 
 220. Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to all 
cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and 
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . . . ."), with CONF. CONST. of 
1861 art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the Confederate States, and treaties made or which shall be made 
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phrase in that section giving U.S. courts jurisdiction over suits "between a 
State and citizens of another State"221—which had initially been interpreted 
as allowing states to be sued in the federal courts by citizens of other 
states222—they added "where the State is plaintiff," capturing the Eleventh 
Amendment’s negation of that possibility.223  Then, when they reached the 
language "between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
citizens, or subjects,"224 they added "but no State shall be sued by a citizen 
or subject of any foreign state."225  That addition was also consistent with 
the Eleventh Amendment, which stated that no suit could be "commenced 
or prosecuted" in the federal courts by citizens or subjects of foreign 
states.226  But it had a particular twist for the Confederacy.  The 
Confederate States of America had been formed out of states that had 
seceded from the Union.  The provision was thus saying that any American 
who remained a citizen of a state in that Union would be classified, under 
the Confederate Constitution, as a "citizen or subject of a foreign state."227  
This meant that any state in the Confederacy that seized the property of 
Americans who were citizens of states remaining in the Union would not be 
amenable to suit in the Confederate courts for the recovery of that 
property.228  
                                                                                                                 
under their authority . . . ."). 
 221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 222. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 449–50 (1793) (acknowledging the potential 
harms of a "compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money" but nonetheless 
concluding that under a fair construction of the Constitution the private citizens of other 
states could bring actions against a state).  
 223. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting jurisdiction over suits 
"between a State and citizens of another State where the State is plaintiff").  
 224. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 225. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (granting jurisdiction over suits 
"between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects; but no State 
shall be sued by a citizen or subject of any foreign state").  
 226. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").  
 227. See DEROSA, supra note 191, at 104 ("It should be kept in mind that foreigners 
included U.S. citizens . . . ."). 
 228. Id.  The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States also 
appeared, verbatim, in the Confederate Constitution as Article II, Section 1, Clause 3.  
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII (changing the process by which members of the Electoral 
College voted for President and Vice-President, and setting forth a procedure where, if no 
candidate received a majority of electoral votes, through voting by states the House of 
Representatives would elect the President and the Senate the Vice-President), with CONF. 
CONST. of 1861 art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (changing the process by which members of the Electoral 
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The last explicit indications that the drafters of the Confederate 
Constitution were dedicated to the principle of state sovereignty are found 
in their deletion of a power associated with the general government in the 
original U.S. Constitution, and the qualification of some other powers given 
to Congress in that document.229  The preamble to the U.S. Constitution 
listed several purposes for which that document was being "ordain[ed] and 
establish[ed]," including "promot[ing] the general Welfare."230  Article I, 
Section 8 of that constitution implemented that purpose by listing, as one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers, that of providing for the "general Welfare 
of the United States."231  The Confederate Constitution eliminated those 
references to the general welfare.232  In the view of the framers of that 
constitution, the "general welfare clause" of the U.S. Constitution had been 
inappropriately thought to supply a rationale for federally directed internal 
improvements and protective tariffs, two policies that many Southerners 
had opposed from the 1820s through the 1850s.233 
To make doubly sure that the new Confederate government would not 
revive those policies, the 1861 framers added two sentences to Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution.  One came in Clause 1 of that section, which 
gave Congress the power to lay and collect taxes and pay the debts of the 
general government.234  That sentence read, "nor shall any duties or taxes 
on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any 
branch of industry."235  The other addition came in Clause 3, giving the 
general government the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign 
                                                                                                                 
College voted for President and Vice-President, and setting forth a procedure where, if no 
candidate received a majority of electoral votes, through voting by states the House of 
Representatives would elect the President and the Senate the Vice-President).  
 229. Infra note 232. 
 230. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 231. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 232. Compare id. (granting Congress the power "[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general 
welfare of the United States"), with CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress 
the power "[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and 
provide for the common defence, and to carry on the government of the Confederate 
States"). 
 233. DEROSA, supra note 191, at 92. 
 234. See CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have power . . . 
[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises for revenue, necessary to pay the 
debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government of the Confederate 
States . . . ."). 
 235. Id. 
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nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."236  It 
provided that "neither this, nor any other clause contained in the 
Constitution shall ever be construed to delegate the power to Congress to 
appropriate money for any internal improvements."237 
There were other changes in the Confederate Constitution which were 
less explicitly concerned with affirming the principle of state sovereignty, 
but nonetheless demonstrated an intention to check any tendencies on the 
part of federal institutions to aggrandize themselves.  Those included 
provisions establishing executive branch representation in the Confederate 
Congress238 and an executive line-item veto over Congressional 
legislation,239 limiting presidential terms to six years, not subject to 
reelection,240 and requiring that the executive initiate and two-thirds of both 
houses of Congress approve any appropriations made from the federal 
treasury.241  Perhaps the most pointed example of the drafters’ concern 
about unchecked federal power was a provision that, after granting 
Congress the power to "establish post-offices and post routes,"242 added that 
"the expenses of the Post Office Department, after the [first] day of March, 
in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and sixty-three, shall be paid out 
of its own revenues."243  The framers of the Confederate Constitution not 
only wanted a limited general government,244 they wanted, wherever 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 237. Id.  The internal improvements clause contained an exception for "the purpose of 
furnishing lights, beacons, and buoys, and other aid to navigation upon the coasts, and the 
improvement of harbors and the removing of obstructions in river navigation."  Id.  The 
costs and expenses of those improvements were to be paid out of "duties . . . laid on the 
navigation facilitated thereby."  Id.  
 238. See id. art. I § 6, cl. 1 ("But Congress may, by law, grant to the principle officer in 
each of the Executive Departments seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of 
discussing any measures appertaining to his department."). 
 239. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("The President may approve any appropriation and 
disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, 
designate the appropriations disapproved . . . ."). 
 240. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("[President] and the Vice President shall hold their offices 
for the term of six years; but the President shall not be reeligible."). 
 241. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 9 ("Congress shall appropriate no money from the Treasury 
except by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses . . . [and] unless it be asked and estimated for 
by some one of the heads of departments and submitted to Congress by the President . . . ."). 
 242. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Alfred L. Brophy & John V.N. Philip, Book Notes, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1256 (1991) ("The Confederate Constitution embodied the Southern desire for a federal 
government, but on its own strictly limited terms."). 
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possible, a general government whose expenses were directly accountable 
and whose departments kept a vigilant eye on one another.245  
The treatment of slavery in new territories had been the central issue 
engendering sectional discord, and that issue remained on the delegates’ 
minds as they created the Confederacy.246  They hoped that the Confederacy 
would acquire new territories from the existing federal territory within the 
borders of the United States, or possibly from other states in the Union, as 
well as from other places.247  They also hoped that slavery would flourish in 
all the territories that were acquired.248  But they could not know that this 
would be so.  It was possible that a majority of the residents of a new 
territory, on seeking admission to the Confederate States of America, would 
not be slave-owners, or might not be disposed toward encouraging the 
growth of slavery in their region, or might even be prepared to enact a state 
constitution abolishing slavery.  Nowhere in the Confederate Constitution 
was there a provision requiring the states that joined it to maintain 
slavery.249  That would have been inconsistent with the principle of state 
sovereignty. 
Yet the seven secessionist states that met to create the Confederacy left 
the Union primarily because their residents feared that the national 
government of the United States would prohibit slavery’s spread into new 
territories and would eventually seek to abolish it in the states where it had 
become established.250  How were the drafters to avoid compelling 
territories who joined the Confederacy as new states to establish slavery—
an apparent violation of the state sovereignty principle—but at the same 
time reaffirm the Confederacy’s commitment to the proposition that the 
right of slaveowners to own property in slaves could not be infringed? 
                                                                                                                 
 245. See David P. Currie, Through the Looking-Glass:  The Confederate Constitution in 
Congress, 1861–1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1351 n.396 (2004) ("The object of this 
[constitutional provision] was to make, as far as possible, each Administration responsible 
for the public expenditures." (internal quotations omitted)). 
 246. Supra Part II.A. 
 247. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. IV, § 3, cl. 3 (noting that the "Confederate States 
may acquire new territory"). 
 248. See Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment:  A Second American 
Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1168 
n.40 (1992) (observing that Alexander Stephens referred to "slavery as [the] cornerstone of 
[the] Confederacy"). 
 249. See generally CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. I–VII (omitting any provision "requiring" 
the individualized Confederate states to maintain slavery). 
 250. Supra Part II.C. 
RECOVERING THE LEGAL HISTORY 505 
The new Clause 3 that the drafters added to Section 3 of Article IV of 
the Confederate Constitution addressed that dilemma.  It provided: 
The Confederate States may acquire new territory; and Congress shall 
have power to legislate and provide governments for the inhabitants of 
all territory belonging to the Confederate States, lying without the limits 
of the several States; and may permit them, at such times, and in such 
manner as it may by law provide, to form States to be admitted into the 
Confederacy. In all such territory, the institution of negro slavery, as it 
now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected 
by Congress and by the territorial government; and the inhabitants of the 
several Confederate States and Territories shall have the right to take to 
such Territory any slaves lawfully held by them in any of the States or 
Territories of the Confederate States.251 
The clause reaffirmed the legitimacy of "the institution of negro slavery" in 
a document that had already prohibited the Confederate government from 
abolishing it, but stopped short of conditioning admission of new states into 
the Confederacy on those states not abolishing slavery.252  How could 
slavery be "recognized and protected by Congress and the territorial 
government,"253 yet not be made a condition of entry into the Confederacy?  
The answer, for those who drafted the Confederate Constitution, was that 
territories were the common property of all the Confederate states, not of 
the federal government, and thus unless the federal government had been 
delegated the power to condition admission of new states on their having 
instituted slavery, it could not make that a requirement.254  On the other 
hand the federal government had been required to recognize and protect 
slavery in the territories.255  Thus, the drafters of the Confederate 
Constitution simultaneously hoped for the best with respect to the spread of 
slavery in any new territories the Confederacy might acquire and prepared 
themselves for the day when they might need to add some states without 
slavery into their nation. 
                                                                                                                 
 251. CONF. CONST. of 1861 art. IV, § 3, cl. 3. 
 252. See generally id. art. I–VII (omitting any provision "requiring" the individualized 
Confederate states to maintain slavery). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of American Liberty:  
The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost Clause," 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 632 (2003) 
("Representatives of slave states insisted that the states had equal rights in the territories 
(which were common property of all the states).  Therefore, slave owners had a right to bring 
their slaves into all the national territories."). 
 255. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (upholding the fugitive slave laws). 
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One of the reasons that the framers of the 1789 Constitution had called 
the Philadelphia convention into being was their concern about the 
disintegrative effects of state sovereignty in a republic whose territory was 
large.256  The framework of governmental powers that they designed in the 
Constitution was not one in which the principal locus of sovereignty lay in 
the states.257  Instead, it was one in which sovereignty was identified as 
ultimately resting in the people at large, and then allocated among two 
governments that served as the people’s representatives, state governments 
and a federal government embodying a union of the states.258  A recurrent 
concern of the 1789 drafters was to identify governmental powers that were 
best exercised by a national government, powers that were best left to 
states, and "rights" of individual citizens that needed to be protected against 
interference by any level of government.259  The drafters of the Confederate 
Constitution may have taken that model of governance as their template, 
but they chose to perceive it as constructed differently.260  They chose to 
perceive that the entire edifice of the U.S. Constitution emanated from the 
premise that sovereignty rested in state governments as representatives of 
the people at large, and that any federal government created out of a 
residuum of state power only existed to further the collective interests of 
states.261  National sovereignty could therefore not exist in contradiction to 
                                                                                                                 
 256. John F. Hart, Human Law, Higher Law, and Property Rights:  Judicial Review in 
the Federal Courts, 1789–1835, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 840 (2003). 
 257. See Chrystal Bobbitt, Domestic Sovereign Immunity:  A Long Way Back to the 
Eleventh Amendment, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 531, 548 (2000) ("Madison argued ardently in 
favor of popular sovereignty resting in the people, and flatly rejected the notion that states 
were sovereign entities."). 
 258. Ashley Dorn, The Untimely Death of the Commerce Clause:  Gonzalez v. Raich’s 
Threat to Federalism, The Democratic Process, and Individual Rights & Liberties, 18 TEMP. 
POL. CIV. RTS. L. REV. 213, 239 n.307 (2009). 
 259. See Burt Neuborne, The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm the Reader 
Became the Book, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2037 (2004) ("The Founders’ first two semantic 
concerns—fear of an inadequate or incomplete description of rights and fear that 
enumerating rights might imply residual governmental powers—reflected the Founders’ 
fears about how the text of the Bill of Rights would be read."). 
 260. Compare U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States . . . do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."), with CONF. CONST. of 
1861 pmbl. ("We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and 
independent character . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate 
States of America." (emphasis added)). 
 261. See Steven A. Bibas, The European Court of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court:  
Parallels in Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 253, 
295 n.223 (1992) ("Confederate political philosophy rested upon ‘the absolute sovereignty of 
the states.’"). 
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state sovereignty, nor could the national government be conceived as 
furthering the interests of individual citizens.262  There was no "national 
community" of individual citizens; the rights of citizens were associated 
with their membership in local and state communities.263  
In the three decades after 1820, representatives of southern states in 
Congress had articulated, and northern representatives had opposed, that 
theory.264  Locus-of-sovereignty debates surfaced in connection with issues 
that were directly or indirectly connected to the relationship of slavery 
toward westward expansion, such as internal improvements, tariff rates, the 
acquisition of new federal territories, and the admission of new states into 
the Union.265  By the 1850s, as those debates continued and southern 
"states’ rights" arguments became more aggressively propounded, 
Southerners became well aware that national trends in population growth, 
territorial expansion, and developments in transportation and 
communication might not only disturb the delicate balance between slave 
and free states, but might also threaten to affect the relationship between 
national and state power in the Union.266  After a decade in which the 
prospect of that relationship being altered to the South’s detriment was 
averted, and the institution of slavery revived, by a combination of 
presidential policies, the dramatic growth of southern-based cotton 
production, congressional compromises, and decisions by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Lincoln’s election threatened to shift the 
sectional balance of power in the Union, and with it the future of slavery.267  
                                                                                                                 
 262. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 pmbl. (failing to provide a "general welfare" clause in 
the Confederate Constitution). 
 263. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the 
Interpretation of State Constitutions:  A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1219, 1265 (1998) ("[C]itizens of the states ‘were never . . . member-citizens of the 
same political community . . . .  The . . . relation which they bore to the Citizens of the 
several States, never constituted a Nation.’  This . . . was the ‘cardinal principle of State 
Rights,’ which was ‘[t]he fundamental principle upon which the several Confederate States 
withdrew . . . .’"). 
 264. E.g., David M. Sprick, Ex Abundanti Cautela (Out of Abundance of Caution):  A 
Historical Analysis of the Tenth Amendment and the Continuing Dilemma over "Federal" 
Power, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 529, 546 (1999). 
 265. E.g., Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View From the Prairie:  Harold Washington and 
the People of Illinois Respond to Federal Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
285, 299 (2005). 
 266. See id. (observing that the Compromise of 1850 only temporarily relieved the 
threat to the Union and ultimately federal sovereignty). 
 267. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual 
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1355 (2000) ("Lincoln’s intensified outcry against 
slavery sounded, to Southern ears, like a call to sectional struggle."). 
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It thus became important to the southern secessionists who formed the 
Confederacy to see the enlistment of national power against slaveholding as 
a deviation from the original principles of the U.S. Constitution.268  They 
read the template for their own constitution as placing the locus of 
sovereignty firmly in the governments of the states, and as clearly 
legitimizing the right of property in African-American slaves—and where 
the template was not explicit enough in those respects, they revised its 
language.269 
In most respects the principle of state sovereignty, as applied to the 
Confederacy, served to reinforce the sanctity of slaveownership.270  All the 
states forming the Confederacy were slave states, and the initial audiences 
for the secessionist commissioners were slave states remaining in the 
Union.  But when protection for the right of slave-ownership ran squarely 
up against the principle of state sovereignty, the drafters of the Confederate 
Constitution opted to subordinate the former to the latter.271  They reasoned 
that because individual sovereignty only manifested itself in the sovereignty 
of states, if a state resolved to abolish the "right" of slave ownership, it 
could.272  When a Georgia delegate to the Confederate constitutional 
convention offered a provision that "no State shall be admitted [to the 
Confederacy] which, by its constitution or laws, denies the right of property 
in negro slaves," the drafters voted it down.273 
Thus one of the ironies of the creation of the Confederacy was that its 
drafters took pains to establish a federal government whose powers were 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Cf. G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1463, 1510 (2003) ("Instead the Court decisively constitutionalized the slavery issue 
in Dred Scott, drew itself prominently into the sectional debate over slavery . . . and brought 
upon itself a line of critical commentary that encouraged Abraham Lincoln, four years after 
the decision, to treat it as if it had very little authority."). 
 269. See CONF. CONST. of 1861 pmbl. (amplifying the importance of states’ rights in the 
Confederacy); see also id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No . . . law denying or impairing the right of 
property in negro slaves shall be passed."). 
 270. Cf. Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Critical Legal Rhetoric Approach to In Re African-
American Slave Descendants Litigation, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 649, 690 (2010) 
("In this account, slavery was not an ultimate cause of war, but rather a collateral cause, 
since its elimination would undermine the South’s autonomy and the states’ rights that 
yielded that autonomy."). 
 271. Supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 272. See George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States:  A 
Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 751 (1992) (indicating that the framers of the 
Confederate Constitution left open the possibility that a state of the Confederacy could 
"abolish slavery within their respective borders"). 
 273. See 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 885 (refusing 
to accept the provision proposed by T.R.R. Cobb on reconsideration).   
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deliberately checked and circumscribed so that the sovereignty of the states 
who formed it could be clearly understood, yet the primary focus of that 
government, during the years of its existence, was in exercising functions—
conducting a war, raising revenue and spending money for that effort, and 
engaging in international diplomacy—that the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution had identified as peculiarly suited for a federal union as 
opposed to individual states.274  The inefficiency and ineptitude of another 
federal government that was understood as being created out of a residuum 
of state power, the Articles of Confederation, had been exposed in a 
wartime setting, and had prompted the idea of a stronger national 
government that eventually emerged in the 1789 Constitution.275  The 
drafters of the 1861 Confederate Constitution can be seen as reviving a 
version of the model of state and federal powers embodied in the Articles. 
Most of the drafters did not anticipate, however, that the Confederacy 
would soon be overseeing a war of much greater magnitude than the 
American Revolution. 
B.  Courts in the Confederacy I:  The Confederate District Courts 
Instead those who created the Confederacy believed, for the most part, 
that they would be residing in a nation where institutions of the previous 
Union government had been replaced by Confederate institutions with more 
limited powers.276  Among those institutions were the courts of the 
Confederacy.  What was to be the business of those courts?  How were they 
to interact with state courts?  How did the organization of the judiciary in 
Confederate states reflect the principles of government animating the 
Confederacy’s creation? 
Three issues connected to the Confederate courts are of particular 
interest.  One involves the question of what laws those courts applied.277  A 
                                                                                                                 
 274. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have power to lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defense . . . ."); see also id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11–12 ("To declare War, . . . To raise and support 
Armies . . . ."). 
 275. Christopher J. Parosa, Federalism:  Finding Meaning Through Historical Analysis, 
82 OR. L. REV. 119, 127 (2003). 
 276. Supra Part III.A. 
 277. The discussion that follows is limited to constitutional courts—that is, courts 
whose jurisdiction was derived from Article III of the Confederate Constitution and whose 
judges were appointed by the President of the Confederacy and accorded life tenure.  CONF. 
CONST. of 1861 art. III, § 1, cl. 1.  There were other courts operating in the Confederate 
states, such as territorial courts, military tribunals, and boards of commissions, established 
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second centers on the relationship between the federal courts in the 
Confederacy and the existing courts of the seceding states.  The last issue 
involves the status of the Supreme Court of the Confederacy.  Such a court 
was provided for in the Confederate Constitution, but despite efforts to 
organize it by the Confederate Congress, was never established.278  
When the first group of secessionist states resolved to leave the Union, 
and delegates assembled in Montgomery, Alabama, to draft a provisional 
Constitution for a confederacy, the structure of courts in the secessionist 
states was as follows.  Each seceding state had state circuit or district courts 
and courts of appeal, their jurisdiction defined by state legislatures and 
constitutions.279  In addition, there were seven U.S. district courts scattered 
throughout the seceding states, ranging from one to two courts in each 
state.280  Five of the original seceding states had been included in the nine 
circuits of the federal courts of the United States, which were composed of 
the federal district judges in those circuits and the Supreme Court justices 
assigned to them.281  At the apex of the system was the Supreme Court of 
the United States, which heard cases on appeal from the highest courts of 
state and on certificate of division from circuit courts of appeal.282 
                                                                                                                 
under various legislative powers given Congress by the Confederate Constitution, whose 
personnel were appointed by Congress for limited terms.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
The Confederate Constitution also provided, modifying the Constitution of the United 
States, that "any judicial or other Federal officer, residing and acting solely within the limits 
of any State," could be impeached by a two-thirds vote of that state’s legislature.  Id. art. I, 
§ 2, cl. 5. 
Of the constitutional courts in the Confederacy, the discussion focuses on district courts 
and the Confederate Supreme Court.  The additional constitutional court was the Court of 
Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction, located at Key West in Florida.  
 278. See John P. Norman, "Self-Preservation is the Supreme Law":  State Rights vs. 
Military Necessity in Alabama Civil War Conscription Cases, 60 ALA. L. REV. 727, 732 
(2009) ("The absence of a Confederate Supreme Court did not stem from the lack of a 
provision for one."). 
 279. Judge Robert W. Lee, Florida Legal History:  The Courts and Law During the 
Civil War, Reconstruction and Restoration Eras, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 485, 488 (2003). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GREY:  A HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 68 (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1991) (1941) 
("[T]he circuit courts were supposed to be three-judge courts, consisting of two justices of 
the Supreme Court and the district judge . . . ."). 
 282. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2.  Of the original states who seceded, Alabama and 
Louisiana were in the Fifth Circuit, South Carolina and Georgia in the Sixth Circuit, and 
Mississippi in the Ninth Circuit.  Neither Florida nor Texas had been included in a circuit.  
In those states, cases designated for the circuit courts were heard by district courts.  Because 
the inclusion of states in a federal circuit meant additional travel and labor for the Supreme 
Court justice assigned to that circuit, states were not included in federal circuits until the 
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Between November 7, 1860, and January 26, 1861, eight of the eleven 
U.S. district judges in the original secessionist states resigned their 
positions.283  One judge in the southern district of Florida and the two 
judges in the eastern and western districts of Texas declined to do so.284  
After Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee seceded in May 
and June, the four district judges in first three of those states resigned, and 
by July of that year the district judge in Tennessee, having been impeached 
by Congress for his secessionist sympathies, was named a Confederate 
district judge for the three districts in the state.285  
The resignation of federal district judges throughout the Confederate 
states created a potential gap in the application of federal law in those 
states.286  Filling that gap was one of the first tasks to which seceding states 
and the Confederate government applied themselves.287  When a United 
States district judge from a state resigned, there was a brief period when the 
court was closed.288  In most instances the resignations took place after the 
state had formally seceded, but some federal judges in the south resigned 
shortly after Lincoln was elected.289  Once states seceded, a provision of the 
state’s ordinance of secession invested the courts of the state with the 
powers of U.S. district and circuit courts and transferred the records of 
cases pending in the U.S. courts to the state courts, where they remained in 
a kind of limbo, being kept separate from state court records.290  Then, as 
part of the initial business of the Confederate constitutional convention in 
February 1861, delegates took steps to create district courts of the 
Confederacy.291  Once the delegates had drafted and adopted a provisional 
                                                                                                                 
federal district courts within them had a sufficient workload of cases.  For more detail, see 
ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 62–68. 
 283. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 14–16. 
 284. Id. at 15–16. 
 285. Id. at 17–18. 
 286. Id. at 9. 
 287. See Lee, supra note 279, at 488 ("[M]ost confederate states reappointed the former 
federal district court judges as confederate judges."). 
 288. Id. 
 289. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 25–26 (observing that Judge Andrew G. 
Magrath, the U.S. district judge for Charleston, South Carolina, resigned his office on 
November 7, 1860, the day after Lincoln’s election).  On May 22, 1861, when Magrath’s 
court reopened as a Confederate district court, Magrath had been reappointed as the district 
judge.  Id. 
 290. See id. at 21 (noting that the records from the former Northern District of Florida 
were transferred to the State circuit courts and kept separate from those of ordinary state 
cases).  
 291. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 279, at 488 ("The Confederate Government created a 
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constitution for the Confederate States of America, they became deputies in 
a provisional Congress of the Confederacy,292 and one of their first acts, on 
February 9, 1861, was to declare that the laws of the United States, as they 
stood on November 1, 1860, would be the laws of the Confederate States as 
far as they were consistent with the provisional Confederate Constitution.293  
That action filled any gap that might have existed with respect to laws 
being applied in the Confederate district courts.  Although some delegates 
to the South Carolina convention had taken the position that secession 
brought a complete abrogation of any laws founded on the Constitution of 
the United States in the state, a subsequent ordinance declared that all 
federal laws would become laws of the state insofar as they were consistent 
with the constitution of South Carolina, and secession ordinances in other 
states made that more explicit.294  Thus there was no period of significant 
length in any of the Confederate states where federal law did not exist, 
although in some there were intervals in which former U.S. district courts 
remained closed while new Confederate district judges were appointed and 
the courts organized.295  Although the Confederate Congress quickly 
confirmed President Davis’s nominees for district judges in March 1861, 
many of the district courts did not open until May, and some not until 
June.296 
The provisional Confederate Congress’s February 9 declaration meant 
that until the Confederate Constitution or enabling legislation provided 
otherwise, any federal courts created in the Confederacy, including a 
Confederate Supreme Court, would have the same jurisdictional powers as 
the courts of the United States.297  That situation did not remain in place 
very long, because delegates to the provisional Congress quickly turned to 
drafting the Confederate Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1861,298 
which altered the jurisdictional reach of the district courts.  
                                                                                                                 
Confederate District Court for Florida."). 
 292. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 22. 
 293. An Act to Continue in Force Certain Laws of the United States of America, 1 
STAT. 27 (Feb. 9, 1861), repealed by the dissolution of the Confederacy in 1865.  For the full 
text of the statute, see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE 
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 27 (James M. 
Mathews, William S. Hein & Co. 1988) (1864) [hereinafter PROVISIONAL CONGRESS 
STATUTES]. 
 294. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 9. 
 295. Id. at 123. 
 296. Id. at 122–23. 
 297. Supra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 298. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 
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Article III of the Confederate Constitution made two significant 
changes from Article III of the U.S. Constitution.  Both changes signaled 
the interest of the convention delegates in limiting the ability of 
Confederate district courts to encroach on state prerogatives.  One change 
eliminated the primary basis of federal court jurisdiction under the U.S. 
Constitution, controversies between citizens of different states.299  The 
change meant that cases in which the parties were residents of different 
states could no longer routinely be brought in the federal courts of the 
Confederacy.  Nor could corporations bring actions in the federal courts to 
avoid having to litigate in the state courts in which their adversaries resided.  
The effect of the deletion was thus to limit the ability of the district courts 
of the Confederacy to entertain garden-variety diversity of citizenship suits.  
The other change omitted the phrase "of law and equity" after "all 
cases" in the sentence in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 that stated, "The 
judicial power shall extend to all cases."300  The omission did not mean that 
the distinction between law courts and equity courts, or between actions in 
law and actions in equity, was abolished in the Confederacy.  It merely 
allowed states to decide for themselves whether to retain the distinction.301  
In some states, such as Louisiana and Texas, civil law traditions resulted in 
the abolition of equity as a separate jurisdiction.302  Other secessionist states 
retained the distinction between law and equity.303  By eliminating the 
phrase, the framers of the permanent Confederate Constitution prepared the 
way for the district courts of the Confederacy to follow the practices of the 
states in which they sat.304  
                                                                                                                 
PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS; 1862 37 (James M. Mathews ed., 
W.W. Gaunt 1970) (1862) (acknowledging that the Confederate judiciary was created on 
March 16, 1861 by an act titled "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the Confederate 
States of America").  
 299. Compare CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (failing to include a diversity 
jurisdiction clause), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend to 
all cases . . . between Citizens of different States . . . ."). 
 300. CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. III, § 2, cl. 1 . 
 301. See David M. Potter, Justice in Grey. A History of the Judicial System of the 
Confederate States of America, 20 TEX. L. REV. 393, 395 (1942) ("Louisiana and Texas . . . , 
preferring the Roman concept of a single jurisdiction, prevailed upon the Southern states to 
omit the distinction, which had been preserved in the courts of the United States."). 
 302. Id. 
 303. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 78 ("The circuit courts possessed equity as well 
as common-law jurisdiction in Missouri, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, Virginia, and North 
Carolina."). 
 304. See, e.g., supra note 301 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana’s and 
Texas’s unique systems). 
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The Confederate Judiciary Act of 1861,305 passed on March 16, made 
that change explicit.  One of its sections provided that the forms of process 
and the modes of proceedings in the trial of suits in law and equity in the 
Confederate district courts would follow those of the state courts.306  The 
retention of the phrase "suits in law and equity" made it clear that if a state 
permitted equitable remedies, such as North Carolina or Georgia, they 
could be invoked by district courts sitting in the state.307  The same section 
stated, however, that the district courts could not make use of equitable 
remedies "in any case where plain, adequate remedy may be had by law."308  
In general, the Judiciary Act sought to streamline the processes of the 
district courts, to conform their modes of procedure to those of the states in 
which they sat, and to confine the scope of their powers.309  The abolition of 
circuit courts reduced the number of federal tribunals.310  Fifteen of the 
fifty-four sections of the Act established state laws and practices as rules for 
the appropriate district courts.311  Others made state laws affecting debtor 
relief, the interest rate allowed on legal judgments, and the costs and fees of 
clerks and marshals binding on the appropriate district courts.312  The Act 
also restricted the authority of the district courts to issue writs of habeas 
corpus to cases involving prisoners held by the Confederate government.313  
The framers of the Confederate Constitution and the Judiciary Act thus 
contemplated that the business of the federal district courts in the 
Confederacy would be far less extensive than their United States 
counterparts.  The Confederate district courts retained authority over such 
traditionally "national" subjects as admiralty and maritime cases, including 
crimes committed on navigable waters, and cases involving patents, 
                                                                                                                 
 305. See Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61 (1861), reprinted in 
PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293. 
 306. See id. § 12 ("And in any state in which there is or may be no separate court of 
equity, the district court shall administer and decide on matters of equity according to the 
course of practice in the courts of such state.").  
 307. Id. 
 308. Id.  
 309. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 61. 
 310. Id. at 24. 
 311. See generally Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61 (1861), reprinted in 
PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293. 
 312. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 61. 
 313. See Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61, § 16 (1861), reprinted in 
PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293 ("Provided, [t]hat writs of habeas corpus 
shall, in no case, extend to prisoners, unless when they are in custody under or by virtue of 
the authority of the Confederate States."). 
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copyrights, and naturalization.314  When the Confederate Congress, mindful 
of the war effort, increased the number of criminal offenses for conduct that 
might help the enemy or disrupt military operations, it gave the district 
courts power to entertain prosecutions under those statutes.315  But beyond 
that, the tendency was to restrict jurisdiction.  The minimum amount of 
damages required to bring civil cases in the district courts was raised to 
$5,000, and no civil suit could be brought in a district court unless the 
defendant was a resident of that district.316  Finally, Article III of the 
Confederate Constitution limited the classes of persons that could institute 
actions in the federal courts.317 
Those who drafted the Confederate Constitution and the Judiciary Act 
of 1861 thus assumed that the state courts of the secessionist states would 
entertain the bulk of judicial business in the Confederacy, and that those 
courts would operate with few changes in their structure and organization.  
Both assumptions were correct.  Secessionist state legislatures and 
constitutions left the jurisdiction and composition of state courts 
comparatively undisturbed during the years of the Confederacy318—but the 
war disrupted the business of state courts.319  In some states, such as 
Tennessee, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and the western portions of 
Virginia, Union armies and sympathizers were able to suspend the 
operation of existing state courts or establish alternative provisional 
courts.320  Many states passed "stay laws," which had the effect of 
continuing legal proceedings in which the participants or attorneys were 
absent in military service.321  The sittings of the highest courts in every state 
                                                                                                                 
 314. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 54–57. 
 315. See id. at 52–53 (illustrating the additional offenses made criminal by the 
Confederate Congress during the war).  State courts were authorized to try federal offenses 
in a limited number of instances, but most alleged violations of the criminal statutes enacted 
by the Confederate Congress were tried in the federal district courts of the Confederacy.  Id. 
at 53. 
 316. Id. at 58–59. 
 317. See CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. III, § 1, cl. 1–2 (extending the judicial power of the 
Confederate States to ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, citizens claiming 
lands under grants of different states, states suing citizens of other states or foreign citizens 
and states, and the Confederate government itself). 
 318. For more detail, see ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 70–121, which summarizes the 
business of the state courts and their interaction with the district courts of the Confederacy.  
 319. See id. at 120 ("The operations of the enemy brought some derangement in the 
supreme court calendars. In occupied or threatened areas, the trial courts were generally 
suspended."). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
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except Alabama were either delayed or reduced over the course of the 
war.322  The records of many cases in the state courts were disrupted, and in 
some instances destroyed, by being exposed to military operations.323  The 
leading study of the Confederate judiciary has estimated that the volume of 
business in the state courts fell from approximately one-half to 
approximately one-third of the number of pre-war cases.324 
C.  Courts in the Confederacy II:  The Supreme Court 
Meanwhile, as the district courts of the Confederacy were organized 
and staffed, members of the Confederate Congress attempted to establish 
the Supreme Court of the Confederate States of America.  As provided for 
in the Provisional Constitution, the court was comprised of all of the judges 
of the Confederate district courts.325  Once those judges were appointed, 
and the Judiciary Act of 1861 passed, it required only to be formally 
organized.326  The date of organization was set for January 20, 1862.327  
Intervening events called into question the Provisional Constitution’s 
model for the Supreme Court.328  Four additional states joined the 
Confederacy in the spring of 1861, which increased the number of 
Confederate district judges to thirteen.329  All of those judges would sit on 
the Confederate Supreme Court.  Within the same time period, the capital 
of the Confederacy moved from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, 
Virginia, which meant that many of the district judges would need to travel 
                                                                                                                 
 322. See id. at 97 ("The Supreme Court of Alabama held all its regular terms, at 
Montgomery, beyond the din of war.").  For a more complete illustration of the other states’ 
delays, see id. at 92–106. 
 323. See id. at 106–07 (estimating, based on the printed records of reported cases in the 
Confederate States, that "the excitement and hazards of the war were devastating to the 
Supreme Court records and reports in most states"). 
 324. Id. at 107. 
 325. See CONF. PROV. CONST. of 1861, art. III, § 1, cl. 3, reprinted in PROVISIONAL 
CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293 ("The Supreme Court shall be constituted of all the 
District Judges, a majority of whom shall be a quorum, and shall sit at such times and places 
as the Congress shall appoint."). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 420–21 ("By July 31, 1861, the number of 
district judges, and ipso facto the number of Supreme Court justices, had grown to 
thirteen. . . .  [T]he impracticability of this composition of the Supreme Court became 
apparent."). 
 329. Id. at 420. 
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long distances to attend Supreme Court sessions and would be absent from 
their districts for months during the year.330  No district court sessions could 
be held in their absence.331  Meanwhile, some states that initially composed 
their Supreme Courts as "conferences" of lower court judges—following 
the blueprint established by the Provisional Constitution for the Supreme 
Court of the Confederacy—abandoned that design.332  Those developments 
resulted in the Confederate Congress passing a bill in July 1861 to 
reorganize the Supreme Court under the Permanent Constitution, which 
provided for such a court but had remained silent on its composition.333  
When President Davis signed the bill on July 31, the reorganization of the 
Supreme Court was at hand; in a message on February 26, 1862, four days 
after his presidential inauguration, Davis asked Congress to start the 
reorganization process.334  
That message ushered in four years of deliberations, in which the 
members of the Confederate Congress never agreed upon a bill organizing a 
Supreme Court for the Confederacy.  At first glance, this failure seems 
inexplicable.  The Confederate states were on a war footing for nearly all of 
their existence.  Certain issues connected to the war effort, such as whether 
Congress could tax state bonds to raise money for the war or institute a 
uniform conscription policy for all the states in the Confederacy, appeared 
to cry out for resolution by an authoritative judicial body, whose decisions 
on constitutional issues could bind the Confederate states.  On closer 
                                                                                                                 
 330. Id. at 420–21. 
 331. See Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61, § 3 (1861), reprinted in 
PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293, at 75 (stating in Section 3 that "a district 
court, in case of the inability of the judge to attend at the commencement of a session, may 
be adjourned to the next regular term, if the judge do not appear"). 
 332. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 421 ("The idea of founding the high court of 
appeals upon a conference of judges of the courts of the next lower level had been tried out 
in many of the Southern States and had been abandoned everywhere except in South 
Carolina, where the plan had been successfully questioned.").  
 333. See CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. III, §§ 1–3 (containing no terms pertaining to the 
Supreme Court’s composition). 
 334. See 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 295, 301, 307 
(noting when the Provisional Congress made amendments to the act entitled "An act to 
establish the judicial courts of the Confederate States of America"); 2 JOURNAL OF THE 
CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 22–23 (providing the text of an address to 
Congress on February 26, 1862, in which President Davis requested "the attention of 
Congress to the duty of organizing a supreme court for the Confederate States, in accordance 
with the mandate of the Constitution"); ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 422 ("[President 
Davis] was inaugurated on the 22nd; and on the 26th he called the attention of the Congress 
to its duty of reorganizing the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Permanent 
Constitution."). 
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examination, however, the failure of the Confederate Congress to organize 
a Supreme Court is one of the Confederacy’s defining gestures in its brief 
history.  In the debate over the organization of the court, one can see in 
sharp relief the visions of sovereignty and governance that informed the 
creation of the Confederacy.335 
The process of establishing the court under the permanent Confederate 
Constitution began with the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1861.336  The 
Act gave the court an extensive appellate jurisdiction over cases coming 
from the district courts, including all serious criminal cases,337 all civil 
cases, in both law and equity, where the amount in dispute exceeded 
$5,000, and all admiralty and maritime cases where the amount exceeded 
$500.338  But the most startling feature of the court’s jurisdiction, as 
proposed by the Act, involved cases coming from the highest state courts.339  
Section 45 of the Act, modeled after Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789,340 provided for the appeal of cases involving the "validity of a treaty 
or statute, or, of an authority exercised under the Confederate States," the 
"validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any state, on the 
ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the 
Confederate States," and the "construction of any clause of the constitution, 
or of a treaty, or statute of commission held under the Confederate 
                                                                                                                 
 335. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 426. 
 336. See Judiciary Act of 1861, § 38 (providing the provision under "An Act to 
establish the Judicial Courts of the Confederate States of America"). 
 337. Serious criminal cases were those cases in which the penalty on conviction was 
death or imprisonment.  See Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61, § 38 (1861), 
reprinted in PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293 (stating that "writs of error 
or appeals to the Supreme Court of the Confederate States shall be allowed the accused in all 
cases, in which the punishment or penalty, upon conviction, is death or imprisonment").  
This was in contrast to the United States law at the time, where the only method of getting a 
criminal case to the Supreme Court of the Unites States was through a certificate of division.  
See Ex parte Gordon, 66 U.S. 503, 505 (1861) (establishing that the only way the Supreme 
Court can express an opinion on criminal proceedings in a Circuit Court is when "the judges 
of the Circuit Court are opposed in opinion upon a question arising at the trial, and certify it 
to this court for its decision"). 
 338. See Judiciary Act of 1861, § 42 (stating that the Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over "all final judgments . . . rendered in any district court . . . where the matter in 
dispute . . . exceeds the sum . . . of five thousand dollars in equity, or of five hundred dollars 
in courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"); ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 47 (same). 
 339. See Judiciary Act of 1861, § 45 (stating that "a final judgment or decree in any 
suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a state . . . may be re-examined, and reversed or 
affirmed in the Supreme Court of the Confederate States, upon a writ of error"). 
 340. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86 (1789) (providing the 
foundational language of Section 42 of the Judiciary Act of 1861). 
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States."341  Each of these bases for the Supreme Court of the Confederacy’s 
appellate jurisdiction raised issues of constitutional construction, the 
supremacy of federal law over competing state law,342 and the relationship 
between the state and federal judiciaries.343 
When Section 45 of the Judiciary Act was reviewed, some members of 
the Confederate Congress were surprised by the omission of the limits on 
Supreme Court review of decisions of the highest state courts included in 
Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.344  The Act provided limited 
appeals in:  (1) cases involving the validity of federal treaties and statutes to 
those in which the decision of a state court was "against their validity"; 
(2) cases involving the validity of state statutes challenged on constitutional 
grounds to those in which the state court decision was "in favor of . . . their 
validity"; and (3) cases where a party had claimed a "title, right, privilege, 
or exemption" from a state law on the basis of the federal constitution or a 
federal treaty, statute, or commission, and the state court had held against 
the exemption being claimed.345  Those qualifications indicated that the 
framers of the Judiciary Act of 1789 wanted to restrict the Confederate 
Supreme Court’s review of decisions of the highest state courts to those 
involving a direct conflict between a state law and the federal constitution 
or federal law.346  Where a state court had acquiesced in the supremacy of 
                                                                                                                 
 341. Judiciary Act of 1861, § 45.  Section 46 of the Act addressed the retroactive effect 
of Section 45, providing that it did not apply to cases decided by state courts between 
secession and the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1861.  See id. § 46 (stating that "all 
judgments . . . made by any state court since the date of secession of such state, upon any 
subject or matter which before such secession was within the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
United States" shall have full force and effect, and are appealable). 
 342. The Confederate Constitution had a Supremacy Clause identical to that of the 
United States Constitution.  Compare CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. VI, cl. 3 ("The 
Constitution, and the laws of the Confederate States made in pursuance thereof, and all 
treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the Confederate States, shall be 
the supreme law of the land . . . ."), with U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("The Constitution and the 
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the Supreme Law 
of the Land . . . ."). 
 343. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 458–91. 
 344. Compare Judiciary Act of 1861, stat. P.C., 1 sess., ch. 61, § 45 (1861), reprinted in 
PROVISIONAL CONGRESS STATUTES, supra note 293 (omitting certain qualifications that are 
present in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1879), with Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 
(establishing certain limiting provisions that are not included in Section 45 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1861). 
 345. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25. 
 346. See id. ("[N]o other error shall be . . . regarded as a ground of reversal in any such 
case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects 
the before mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, 
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federal law, the Act’s framers concluded that the court did not need to 
undertake review.347 
It is unclear what motivated the drafters of the Act to omit the 
limitations provided in Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, or what was 
the basis of the initial opposition to Section 45.  Congressional divisions 
about that section would fatally affect the organization of the Confederate 
Supreme Court.348  The divisions did not center on whether the court’s 
power to review the decisions of the highest courts of states should be more 
extensive than that afforded the Supreme Court of the United States.  
Instead, they centered on whether the court should have the power of 
appellate jurisdiction at all. 
After Davis called for the reorganization of the court on February 26, 
1862, both the Senate and the House introduced bills for that purpose.  
During debates on the bills, the very sort of issue that seemed necessary for 
the Supreme Court of the Confederacy to resolve surfaced.349  After the 
Confederate Congress levied a war tax on the states in August 1861,350 
South Carolina argued that the Congress had no power to tax money 
invested in state bonds, and thus bonds should be exempted from the war 
tax.351  A district judge in South Carolina agreed.352  The Confederate 
government appealed that decision, but an appeal was only possible to the 
Confederate Supreme Court, which had not formally come into being.353 
                                                                                                                 
statutes, commissions, or authorities in disputes."). 
 347. Supra notes 344–46 and accompanying text. 
 348. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 458 (opining that the question of whether the 
Supreme Court of the Confederate States should have appellate jurisdiction over the highest 
state courts in cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the Confederate state 
"released a storm of oratory" for several months in 1863). 
 349. Id. at 424–25. 
 350. Id. at 426; MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 438 ("In 
August 1861 a direct tax of one-half of one percent on real and personal property became 
law."). 
 351. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 425 (stating that the Secretary of the Treasury 
had reported to the House of Representatives on August 18, 1862 that "by a judgment of the 
district judge of South Carolina money invested in State bonds has been excepted from the 
war tax"). 
 352. See C. G. Memminger, Confederate States of America, Treasury Department (Jan. 
10, 1862), in 2 WAR OF THE REBELLION:  A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE 
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. IV, at 317 (photo. reprint 1972) (Fred C. Ainsworth 
& Joseph W. Kirkley eds., 1900) [hereinafter 2 WAR OF THE REBELLION] ("[The tax of one 
per cent on property] would be subject to still further abatement so long as the decision of 
the Confederate court of South Carolina as to the power of Congress to tax State bonds 
remains unreversed."). 
 353. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 425. 
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No progress was made on the bill to organize the Supreme Court in 
either of the Confederate Congress’s 1862 sessions.  In January 1863, the 
Attorney General and Treasury Secretary of the Confederacy, in separate 
comments,354 referred to South Carolina’s resistance to the war tax on state 
bonds, and suggested that other states may resist state bonds being taxed on 
similar grounds.355  It was vital that a supreme court be organized in order 
to decide issues affecting the conduct of the war.356  This stimulated the 
Senate to once again take up a bill organizing the court in January 1863; a 
bill, similar to the bill postponed the previous March, was introduced on 
January 19, 1863.357  
During debates on the bill, Senator Clement C. Clay of Alabama 
proposed that a section be added to repeal Section 45 of the Judiciary Act of 
1861.358  Clay’s motion set off a series of debates on the question of 
whether Congress had the power to give a Supreme Court appellate 
jurisdiction over the final decisions of the highest state courts.  Those 
debates were suspended on February 6, and resumed on March 16.359  On 
March 18, the Senate voted 16-6 to add Clay’s amendment, and 
subsequently voted 14-8 to pass the bill.360 
The next day the Senate bill was sent to the House of Representatives 
and referred to its Judiciary Committee.  On April 9, 1863, the committee 
reported the bill with an amendment deleting the section repealing Section 
45 of the Judiciary Act of 1861.361  A motion to postpone consideration of 
the bill until the fall session passed, 39-30, with several members of the 
                                                                                                                 
 354. See id. at 424–25 (quoting sections from Attorney General Watts’s letter to 
President Davis on January 1, 1863, and two Secretary of the Treasury Memminger reports 
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respectively).  
 355. Supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 356. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 424 (stating Attorney General Watts’s letter to 
President Davis that the "many conflicting decisions, under confiscation, conscription, and 
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 357. Id. at 426; see 3 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 20 
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 360. 3 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 176–77. 
 361. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 433. 
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House absent.362  In the fall session of 1863, the bill was once again 
postponed until the January 1864 session.363  It was not taken up during that 
session, and the First Congress of the Confederacy’s term expired in 
February 1864.364  In the Second Congress, the Senate took no action on 
any bill to organize the court.365  Sporadic efforts to that end were made in 
the House:  a bill in May 1864, which was referred to the Judiciary 
Committee and not reported; another on November 18 with the same effect; 
and a third on November 29, this time submitted by the House Judiciary 
Committee.366  That bill was not taken up by the full House until March 
1865, and it was then tabled.367  The January 1865 session of the 
Confederate Congress subsequently adjourned, scheduling its next session 
for November 1865; by then the Confederacy had formally expired.368  
Thus, the Confederate States of America went through its entire existence 
without a supreme court. 
The deep reluctance on the part of members of the Confederate 
Congress to establish a supreme court for the Confederacy illustrates how 
persistently sensitive the issue of the Supreme Court of the United States’s 
power to review the actions of the highest state courts had been from the 
1820s through the 1850s.369  That issue surfaced with the Marshall Court’s 
decisions in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee370 and Cohens v. Virginia.371  In both 
cases the Virginia Court of Appeals declared that Section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act was unconstitutional, and declined to cooperate in producing 
                                                                                                                 
 362. Id.; 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 320. 
 363. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 434. 
 364. See id. ("With the expiration of the First Congress on February 17, 1864, the bill 
became a dead issue."). 
 365. See id. at 434 ("[T]he Senate of the Second Congress was free to pass a new [bill].  
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 366. Id. 
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 368. Id. at 435. 
 369. See id. at 439 (indicating that although Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
gave the Supreme Court the power to review judgments of the highest state courts, Southern 
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 370. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 362 (1816) (holding that the Supreme 
Court is granted the power to question and revise the proceedings of state courts by the 
Constitution). 
 371. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 447 (1821) (holding that the Supreme Court 
is granted the power to review the judgments of state courts in criminal prosecutions by the 
Constitution). 
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a record for appeal of its decisions to the Supreme Court of the United 
States.372  Anonymous pamphlets in Virginia newspapers attacked the 
reasoning of both decisions, and Congress made efforts to repeal Section 25 
of the Judiciary Act of 1789.373 
A number of other significant Marshall Court decisions in the 1820s 
and 1830s affected the powers of the states, and engendered sharp 
protests.374  Representatives from Kentucky complained when the Court 
upheld a "compact" between that state and Virginia—fashioned when the 
new state of Kentucky was carved out of trans-Appalachian lands granted 
to Virginia—which provided that land titles in Kentucky were to be 
governed by Virginia law.375  Several states sharply protested against the 
Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland376 that states could not tax the 
Bank of the United States, and Ohio and Kentucky refused to comply with 
the decision, prompting a case in which the Court held that the Bank could 
sue a state official in the federal courts for improperly taxing it.377  When 
Georgia attempted to pass laws affecting the Cherokee tribe, which owned 
land within the state, the Court held that the tribe was an independent 
sovereign nation and thus Georgia had no jurisdiction over its territory.378  
Georgia, which refused to argue its position before the Court, responded by 
                                                                                                                 
 372. See G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815–35, in 3–4 
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 373. Id. at 504–24. 
 374. Id. at 485–86. 
 375. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1823) ("Kentucky . . . being a party to the 
compact which guarantied to claimants of land lying in that State, under titles derived from 
Virginia . . . as they existed under the laws of Virginia, was incompetent to violate that 
contract, by passing any law which rendered those rights less valid."). 
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 378. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 530 (1831) ("[T]he said Cherokee nation 
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territory . . . ."). 
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declining to comply with the Court’s mandate to release persons it had 
arrested on tribal lands until the Cherokees agreed to leave the state.379 
Other issues that did not involve the Court directly in the 1820s and 
1830s, such as the constitutionality of federal internal improvements 
legislation380 and South Carolina’s effort to "nullify" tariff legislation 
passed in 1828 and 1832,381 signaled that states were chafing under the 
Court’s Section 25 jurisdiction.382  As part of its strategy for "nullifying" 
the tariff legislation, South Carolina provided in its November 1832 
"Ordinance of Nullification," that no appeal from the ordinance could be 
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.383 
By the 1850s, the politics of Supreme Court review of state high court 
decisions became more complicated with the growing sectional tension 
over slavery and its possible extension, resulting in northern as well as 
southern courts protesting against the power of the Court to engage in 
constitutional review of their actions.384  In 1854, the Court in a Section 25 
case from Ohio held that an Ohio statute depriving a bank of an exemption 
from taxation, which was granted in the bank’s charter of incorporation, 
violated the Contracts Clause of the Constitution.385  When the Ohio 
Supreme Court received notice of the Court’s reversal and a mandate to 
enter judgment for the bank, the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court 
initially persuaded his colleagues to ignore the mandate; they did not do so 
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until 1856, when the case was reargued before them.386  In his dissent from 
the Ohio court’s 1856 decision, Chief Justice Thomas Bartley argued that 
Section 25 was unconstitutional.387  
Finally, in a celebrated episode that stretched between 1854 and 1860, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 
unconstitutional,388 and overturned a federal district court’s conviction of a 
newspaper editor who rescued a slave in violation of that Act.389 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court then refused to recognize a Section 25 writ of 
error to the Court.390  Even after a unanimous opinion391 by Chief Justice 
Taney demonstrated that state courts had no constitutional power to correct 
the decisions of federal courts on matters of federal law—nor to refuse to 
comply with the modes of appeal from state courts to the Supreme Court 
that Congress, pursuant to the Constitution, had prescribed—the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court refused to file the mandate to rearrest the editor.392 
Thus by the time the members of the Confederate Congress came to 
consider organizing a Supreme Court, the federal judiciary’s ability to 
affect the decisions of states through the exercise of its constitutional 
review powers, and the desire of states to resist such action by federal 
courts, had become recurrent issues in American jurisprudence.393  As 
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Taney put it in the Wisconsin editor’s case, a federal supreme court was a 
symbol of a tribunal that had "appellate power in all cases arising under the 
Constitution and [federal] laws" so as to allow the "angry and irritating 
controversies between sovereignties" to be settled "in the peaceful forms of 
judicial proceeding."394  Without the opportunity to review the decisions of 
the highest state courts on constitutional and federal law issues, the 
Confederate Supreme Court would not have been such a tribunal. 
In the Confederate Congress’s debates on the organization of the 
Supreme Court, one can find echoes of the arguments that had swirled 
around the relationship between the federal judiciary and the states for more 
than forty years.  Two excerpts from arguments for and against a supreme 
court with full Section 45 review powers reveal these echoes.  When those 
arguments are placed alongside one another, they reveal that a supreme 
court possessed of Section 45 review powers was simply not an institution 
that a majority of the members of the Confederate Congress could bring 
themselves to establish.395  
Augustus H. Garland of Arkansas, chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, made the argument in support of a supreme court with full 
Section 45 review powers on April 9, 1863.396  William L. Yancey, Senator 
from Alabama, made the opposing argument months earlier on February 4, 
1863.  Garland argued: 
Look for a moment at the state of affairs if we had thirteen independent 
courts, whose decisions on [constitutional issues] should be final.  
Different states may well entertain different opinions on the true 
construction of the constitutional power of Congress . . . .  Dispense 
with a common tribunal in the last resort, and leave these questions to 
State courts, and . . . .  [t]he uniformity of the laws—the very life blood 
of laws, desirable everywhere will be destroyed, and above all equality 
among the States, one of the symbols of States rights, will be lost sight 
of forever. . . .  One State could relieve herself of any burdens of this 
war, and thus you would see the majesty of a government confessedly 
supreme in its sphere prostrated at the feet of any one State . . . .  
Certainly as to foreign powers the Confederate States are a nation.  You 
tell France or England we will carry on commerce with them under a 
regular treaty, but if their vessels touch at Charleston or New Orleans 
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and some question arise under that treaty, South Carolina or Louisiana 
one will determine the dispute—a power not responsible in any manner 
to them, and not known in law to them!  How long do you suppose 
they . . . would trade with a power that was thus uncertain as to its being 
a nation?397 
Yancey countered: 
Suppose for instance, this law [organizing the Supreme Court with 
Section 45 intact] remains, and as a consequence you have unity in the 
interpretation of Confederate laws by the decision of the Judicial power 
of the Confederate States.  There will be constitutional questions arising 
affecting the rights of the States; and the State tribunals . . . may unite in 
declaring a Confederate law to be unconstitutional, which the Supreme 
Court will reverse and declare to be constitutional.  The sovereignty—
the reserved rights of the States—will in such event be made to yield to 
the decision of five office holders of the Confederate Government, 
appointed by the Confederate Executive . . . .  Determine this to be the 
law, and that the construction of the Constitution by the Confederate 
Government shall be enforced against the decisions of the State courts, 
and on that day you will have planted the roots of the dissolution of this 
Confederacy; on that day you will have imported into this new 
Government the evils that destroyed the old.  The lights of a sore 
experience—all the travails we have undergone—will avail naught if we 
are to tread the same path of aggression upon the rights of the States to 
the final disruption of this Government.  Such will be the effect of 
giving to the Supreme Court the capacity to absorb within itself the 
Judicial power of the States on questions involving the reserved rights of 
the people.398 
In those excerpts one sees how the long memory of Supreme Court 
decisions allegedly extending the powers of the federal government at the 
expense of the states, coupled with the conclusion by secessionists that the 
South was, and would remain, a political minority in the Union, had taken 
on such emotional force within the Confederacy that they obscured the 
practical facts to which Garland alluded.  The Confederacy needed a 
supreme court to reconcile conflicting lower court decisions on issues 
involving its Constitution and laws.399  Without Section 45 jurisdiction the 
Confederate Supreme Court would be unable to reconcile those decisions, 
some of which would surely emanate from the state supreme courts.  
Without that reconciliation, some potential absurdities, such as varying 
constructions of a Confederate treaty with a foreign nation by state courts, 
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might result.400  To create a supreme court of the Confederacy without the 
power to review decisions from state courts would be to leave the 
interpretation of the Confederate constitution in a permanently unsettled 
state.  Yet Yancey’s excerpt suggested that to establish a court with Section 
45 review powers was to reestablish the "seventy years of 
maladministration of the federal government" that advocates of secession 
had identified as a principal reason for southern states leaving the Union.401  
Given the choice of alternatives Garland and Yancey posed, the 
Confederate Congress elected not to organize a supreme court.402  Its 
members would surely have done so eventually had the Confederate States 
of America remained in existence, but whether that court would have had 
the power to review decisions of the highest courts of states, and whether, if 
it did not, it would have been a tribunal of any significance in the legal and 
political history of the Confederacy, are questions whose answers cannot 
easily be extrapolated from Congress’s consideration of the court between 
early 1862 and the winter of 1864.  All that one can say, after examining 
the debates about the court in Congress, is that the very secessionist 
arguments that had inspired states to leave the Union were proving 
troublesome to the formation of institutions in the Confederacy that sought 
to represent the interests of those states as a collective body.  However 
much as those who championed secession sought to identify that cause with 
the liberties of people residing in individual states, they were well aware 
that states seceding from one union needed to join together for some 
purposes:  They needed the protection of a federal government, with a 
federal constitution and federal institutions such as courts.  It seemed an 
easy step, in fact, for those who drafted the provisional and permanent 
Confederate constitutions to create a supreme court.  But when it came to 
allowing that court power to review the decisions of the highest state courts 
in the Confederacy, the Confederate Congress balked because of the logic 
of their own states’ rights arguments. 
Thus the debate over a Confederate Supreme Court helps capture an 
endemic feature of the Confederacy itself.  It was constantly struggling to 
establish its identity as a government that was separate from, as well as the 
agent of, the states that formed it.  Although the Confederate Constitution 
explicitly identified its "federal" powers—such as declaring war, raising 
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and supporting an army and a navy, laying and collecting taxes, engaging in 
foreign relations, and regulating commerce between the states—state 
concerns constantly shadowed those powers.403  It was as if, having 
conceded that some federal powers were necessary for any sovereign 
nation, those who formed the Confederacy continued to seek reassurance 
that those powers were being exercised with the states’ interests in mind.  
When Yancey argued that the Supreme Court of the Confederacy’s reversal 
of a decision of a state court on a constitutional issue was tantamount to 
"the sovereignty—the reserved rights of the States" being made "to yield to 
the decision of five office holders of the Confederate Government," he 
revealed that he could not countenance the idea of the states and the 
Confederacy as fully separate sovereigns.404  Yet for the Confederacy to act 
effectively as a representative of the collective interests of the states who 
seceded from the Union, it needed to exercise sovereign powers that were 
not merely extensions of state power.  As we will see, that tension between 
the role of the Confederacy as a national government and the conception of 
it as an agent of secessionist states recurrently affected its representatives’ 
treatment of legal issues. 
IV.  Central Legal Issues for the Confederacy 
A defining feature of the experience of those who created the 
Confederate States of America was the dissonance between their initial 
expectations and the concerns that came to preoccupy their leaders.  In the 
weeks in which secessionist sentiment swept through southern states and 
the government of the Confederacy was launched, it appeared to many 
participants in those ventures that within a short period the Confederate 
States of America would be recognized as an independent nation, some sort 
of peace with the Union government would be negotiated, and the residents 
of the Confederacy could turn their attention to the ordinary tasks of 
plantation and farm life.405  The prospects for successful commercial ties to 
Europe, centering on the world-wide demand for cotton, appeared 
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favorable.406  Given the difficulties Union forces would face in fighting a 
war on southern soil, many anticipated that if Confederate armies massed 
troops in defense of southern cities and forts, while mounting forays into 
northern territory to threaten Washington, the Union government would 
welcome an early peace that would result in the official recognition of the 
Confederacy and the perpetuation of slavery.407  Accordingly, much of the 
work of the drafters of the Confederate Constitution was devoted to 
establishing the sort of government that would embody principles which 
had driven the movement for secession:  strong, autonomous state 
governments; a federal Congress dependent on the states; a federal 
executive whose powers were circumscribed; and federal district courts of 
limited jurisdiction.408  
Shortly after the Confederacy was established, however, it became 
apparent that the expectations of its leaders about the course of the war and 
independence were misplaced.  The Union government responded to 
secession by calling up troops and blockading southern ports.409 England 
and France did not recognize the Confederacy.  Union armies began 
invading the South on multiple fronts.410  From almost the moment of its 
inception, the first priorities of the Confederate government were military 
priorities.  
Consequently, the central legal issues with which Jefferson Davis and 
the members of the Confederate Congress concerned themselves during the 
Civil War were issues connected to the conduct of that war.  Taken 
together, the issues demonstrated the need for Confederate policymakers to 
impose a superstructure of federal military power over the local and state 
institutions whose autonomy had been emphasized in the Confederate 
                                                                                                                 
 406. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 382–87 (describing the ultimately 
frustrated hopes of the Confederacy that British and French worries over a cotton famine 
would be beneficial for the South’s business and foreign policy). 
 407. See CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLICT, supra note 405, at 4 ("Enthusiasm ran high 
because of the general apprehension that the war would be terminated in a month or two by a 
grand march of the Confederate forces to Washington."). 
 408. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 22. 
 409. See MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 369–87 (detailing the Union 
blockade of the southern shoreline with three dozen ships, and describing major battles in 
the early months of the blockade off Virginia’s coast, as well as the effect of the blockade on 
the Confederacy’s foreign relations with Britain and France). 
 410. See CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLICT, supra note 405, at 12–13 (explaining that, early 
on in the war, the Union had advanced upon the forts of the upper Mississippi, the cities of 
Nashville, Memphis and New Orleans, and was in a position to advance on Richmond at the 
end of the winter if the Confederacy continued to take no action). 
RECOVERING THE LEGAL HISTORY 531 
Constitution.411  Although that superstructure was necessary to the 
Confederate war effort, it was periodically resisted by members of the 
Confederate Congress, who retained their commitments to the interests of 
their own states and their theoretical endorsement of state sovereignty.412  
The result was a continuous tension between efforts on the part of Davis to 
further the war effort by extending the military power of the Confederacy 
over civilians and civilian institutions, and efforts on the part of the 
Confederate Congress to resist Davis’s overtures.413 
A.  Martial Law and the Suspension of Habeas Corpus 
The Civil War period represented the first time since the framing of 
the Constitution that the "privilege of the writ of habeas corpus" was 
regularly suspended, and several of those suspensions took place in the 
Confederacy.414  In order to understand the implications of suspending the 
                                                                                                                 
 411. Id. at 13–14. 
 412. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 359–419. 
 413. CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLICT, supra note 405, at 13–14. 
 414. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.");  CONF. CONST. of 1861, art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (same).  During the Revolutionary War, 
"at least five states enacted suspension legislation."  Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 622 (2009).  In 1807, President Thomas Jefferson 
requested the suspension of habeas corpus in connection with the alleged conspiracy of 
Aaron Burr and others to encourage portions of the newly-acquired Louisiana Territory to 
detach themselves from the Union.  See id. at 630 ("Jefferson is reported to have requested 
that Congress enact a suspension in the wake of the release by a habeas court of one of the 
Burr conspirators.").  The Senate acceded to Jefferson’s request, but the House of 
Representatives declined to support it.  See id. at 631 ("Extensive debate on the Senate bill 
followed in the House, where it found little support, and the proposal quickly died.").  
Habeas corpus was not suspended during the War of 1812.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
Field Theory: Martial Law, The Suspension Power and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. 
REV. 391, 421–22 (2007) (noting that Andrew Jackson was held in contempt and fined by 
the judge of a Federal District Court in Louisiana when, during the Battle of New Orleans, 
Jackson seized a writ of habeas corpus demanding the production of a prisoner and arrested 
the District Court judge for issuing the writ).  It was temporarily suspended during the 1842 
"Dorr War," in which two factions in Rhode Island claimed to be the legitimate government 
of that state.  See id. at 425 ("[T]he Charter General Assembly proclaimed martial law on 
June 26, after which there were mass arrests and reprisals."). 
Another instance in American history in which the writ of habeas corpus was 
suspended was in 1871, when Congress authorized suspension as a response against violence 
initiated by the Ku Klux Klan in South Carolina.  Amanda Tyler, Suspension as an 
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 660 (2009).  In 1902, the governor of the Philippines 
announced a suspension in response to an armed insurrection.  Id. at 663 n.311.  The final 
instance of suspension was in 1941, when the governor of Hawaii suspended habeas corpus 
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writ of habeas corpus in wartime, it is necessary to review the connection 
between habeas corpus suspensions and declarations of martial law.  The 
term martial law serves to describe situations in which an ordinary civilian 
legal regime is replaced by one established and enforced by representatives 
of the military in territory that is contested or occupied because of a war or 
rebellion.415   
Martial law can encompass quite different settings, and did so in the 
Civil War.  The Union imposed martial law in portions of Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, and Maryland in periods when Lee’s army and the Army of 
the Potomac simultaneously occupied those areas.416  It was also imposed in 
portions of Missouri, where guerilla fighting and efforts at sabotage were 
common among Union and Confederate partisans for much of the war, and 
in Kentucky, eventually encompassing the entire state.417  It also existed in 
areas where Union forces had recaptured territory in Confederate states, 
most prominently in New Orleans.418   
On the Confederate side, martial law was first imposed in December 
1861, around Knoxville, Tennessee.419  The proclamation was made by a 
Confederate general without the authorization of the War Department.420  
Subsequently, President Davis imposed martial law in the area 
encompassing Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia on February 27, 1862.421  
That same day, Congress authorized Davis to suspend habeas corpus "in 
such cities, towns, and military districts as shall, in his judgment, be in such 
danger of attack by the enemy as to require the declaration of martial law 
for their defense."422  Shortly after issuing his February 27 proclamation 
suspending habeas corpus and declaring martial law in Norfolk and 
Portsmouth, Davis extended martial law to Richmond, Petersburg, and 
several counties fronting on the Chesapeake Bay east of Richmond.423  Over 
                                                                                                                 
and imposed martial law after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.  Id. at 663 n.312. 
 415. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1063 (9th ed. 2009) (defining martial law as "the 
law by which during wartime the army, instead of civil authority, governs the country 
because of a perceived need for military security or public safety"). 
 416. JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 170–71 (rev. ed. 
1951). 
 417. Id. at 171. 
 418. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY, supra note 17, at 623. 
 419. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 389. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. at 390. 
 422. Act of February 27, 1862, ch. 2, Confed. Pub. L., 1 Stat. 1.  
 423. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 391.  More information on the geographical extent 
of the proclamations is contained in their full text.  See Jefferson Davis, General Orders, No. 
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the course of the war, Davis or Confederate generals imposed martial law in 
western Virginia; eastern Tennessee; areas of South Carolina; Mobile, 
Alabama; and parishes around New Orleans.  Eventually, as more generals 
began choosing to place areas in which their troops were stationed under 
martial law, the Confederate War Department issued an order, on August 6, 
1862, stating that generals had no authority to declare martial law absent 
presidential authorization.424 
A month after that order was executed, the legislation authorizing 
Davis to declare martial law expired.425  Members of the Confederate 
Congress expressed concern about the relationship between martial law and 
the liberties of citizens of the Confederate states under the Constitution, and 
in October 1862, the House Judiciary Committee produced a bill that 
authorized the President to suspend habeas corpus but stopped short of 
giving him the power to declare martial law.426  The bill was also of limited 
duration:  It was scheduled to expire on February 11, 1863.427  Martial law 
continued in portions of Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee throughout 1863, 
but when the governor of Florida asked Davis to declare it in portions of 
that state in February 1864, Davis declined.428 
As the above details suggest, the imposition of martial law and the 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus are related, but do not perform 
identical functions.  A declaration of martial law within a particular area 
                                                                                                                 
9 (Mar. 1, 1862), in 51 WAR OF THE REBELLION:  A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS 
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, pt. II, at 482 (1897) [hereinafter 51 WAR OF 
THE REBELLION] (reprinting the order from President Davis to suspend habeas corpus in and 
around Richmond); Jefferson Davis, General Orders, No. 11 (Mar. 8, 1862), in 51 WAR OF 
THE REBELLION, supra, ser. I, pt. II, at 493 (reprinting the order from President Davis to 
suspend habeas corpus in and around Petersburg); Jefferson Davis, General Orders, No. 15 
(Mar. 14, 1862), in 51 WAR OF THE REBELLION, supra, ser. I, pt. II, at 502 (reprinting the 
order from President Davis to suspend habeas corpus in the counties of eastern Virginia). 
 424. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 396. 
 425. Id. at 398. 
 426. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 508.  The 
resolution was enacted on October 13, 1862.  See id. at 557 ("The Senate have passed a bill 
of this House (H. R. 44) entitled ‘An act authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus.’"). 
 427. See id. at 517 (amending the resolution to read "the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus shall be, and the same is hereby, suspended from and after the passage of this act 
until after the expiration of thirty days from the commencement of the next session of this 
Congress").  
 428. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 403.  See Letter from John Milton to General G.T. 
Beauregard (Feb. 5, 1864), in 35 WAR OF THE REBELLION:  A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, pt. I, at 563–64 (1891), for text of 
Governor Milton’s letter. 
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replaces the civilian legal authorities in that area with military authorities.429  
It does not require that all persons detained by the military be tried by 
military commissions as opposed to civilian courts.430  It does, however, 
assume either that civilian courts will be closed in the areas governed by 
martial law, or, if they remain open—as they did in many places in the 
Confederacy that were allegedly governed by martial law—military 
authorities will make the decision to keep them open.431  
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has a different 
effect.  It does not, in itself, institute martial law.  It merely allows military 
or civilian officials, acting under orders from civilian authorities, to detain 
persons for the protection of the public safety without having to provide a 
reason for their detention.432  The writ itself—the mechanism by which 
detained persons challenge the basis of their detention before a court—is 
not suspended; in areas or classes of cases governed by suspension 
proclamations, writs may still be issued.  The effect of suspension is on the 
privilege:  The authorities detaining the prisoner need not produce the 
prisoner’s body before a court.  When a suspension of the privilege exists, 
detained prisoners simply remain in custody until the suspension ends.  
After that occurs, they need to be released or brought to trial in civilian 
courts.  
Habeas corpus suspensions thus have in some respects narrower 
impacts on civilians than  declarations of martial law, since their chief 
impact is on cases in which the detaining authority wants to confine, on a 
preventive basis, persons ordinarily eligible for trials in civilian courts.  
When martial law is in operation, all detained persons within areas 
                                                                                                                 
 429. See supra note 415, for a definition of martial law. 
 430. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 392–93 (describing advice given to Davis by the 
Attorney General that "[t]he usual civil jurisdiction should be allowed . . . the exception 
should only prevail when absolutely necessary.  Orders should be so framed as to permit the 
normal business of the courts, except when such interfered with military operations"). 
 431. See id. at 393 n.32 (quoting Davis’s report to the Senate that the "action [of the 
civil courts] in all cases [is] regarded as an assistance and not an obstacle to the military 
authorities in accomplishing the purposes of the proclamations").  Davis’s full report to the 
Senate expands on this premise.  See 2 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra 
note 197, at 445, for the text of Davis’s report. 
 432. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:  English Texts, 
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 598 (2008) (defining a 
traditional writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as an order "directing the jailer to produce 
the body of the prisoner along with an explanation of the cause of the prisoner’s detention").  
Thus, suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus means the ability to arrest a 
person for any reason and not be required to prove to a court that the arrest was legal or 
justified. 
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governed by it are eligible for trial and possible punishment by military 
tribunals under the laws of war, whose offenses and punishments differ 
from civilian laws.433 
In another respect, however, habeas corpus suspensions can be thought 
of as having a broader potential effect on the civil liberties of civilians in 
wartime than martial law declarations.  Unless a civilian detained by 
authorities in an area governed by martial law qualifies as a prisoner of 
war—for which, under military law, there are technical requirements—the 
civilian will eventually need to be brought before a military tribunal, 
charged with an offense, and tried.  In contrast, a civilian detained on a 
preventive basis in an area where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
had been suspended would typically have no way of challenging his or her 
detention, and might be confined indefinitely in a civilian prison. 
For the spring and summer of 1862, as northern armies began to 
invade the South in a variety of places, requests for the imposition of 
martial law grew, so that it was proclaimed not only in the western portions 
of Virginia but in various areas of North and South Carolina, Florida, 
Alabama, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas.  But the 
administration of martial law by military commanders was uneven and 
caused resentment, and by the time Congress reassembled to consider 
renewing the February 27 legislation, which was set to expire in September 
1862, opposition to martial law had surfaced.  The Judiciary Committee of 
the House was instructed to not only report on the state of the law in areas 
of the Confederacy where martial law had been established, but also to 
"report what legislation is necessary to define ‘martial law’ and protect the 
constitutional rights of the citizens, and at the same time give to the 
Executive the powers necessary for the military police of invaded 
districts."434  The report eventually concluded that "[i]f martial law over the 
people be necessary in any case, it should be regulated and defined in a 
sense consistent with the Constitution by distinct enactments."435  It also 
doubted that "the phrase ‘martial law’" was salutary, calling it "at best, 
ambiguous" and capable of "convey[ing] ideas dangerous to liberty," and 
suggested that "it is wiser in our legislation to substitute for it such positive 
regulations as may be deemed necessary."436  As we have seen, neither 
                                                                                                                 
 433. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 54 (1866) ("[T]he proclamation of martial law 
renders every man liable to be treated as a soldier."). 
 434. 5 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 318. 
 435. Id. at 376. 
 436. Id. at 376–77.  
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Davis nor Congress declared martial law for the remainder of the 
Confederacy’s existence, although military commanders continued to 
sporadically impose it. 
Meanwhile, elements in the Confederate Congress were resisting the 
renewal of Davis’s power to suspend habeas corpus.437  In the bill renewing 
that power, which Davis signed on October 13, 1862, Congress instructed 
Davis to appoint officials to determine whether persons had been properly 
detained by Confederate authorities.438  In addition, the authorization to 
suspend habeas corpus was of limited duration:  It expired on February 11, 
1863, thirty days after the beginning of the next session of Congress.439  
When that session began, a bill was introduced to continue the 
authorization, but no action was taken.440   Opposition to the idea of 
suspension had been growing in Congress.  In February 1863, the House of 
Representatives asked Davis for a list of civilians in custody with military 
authorities, which Davis did not furnish.441  In April a Mississippi 
Congressman introduced a bill imposing a penalty for attempting to declare 
martial law within the Confederate States.442  That bill was tabled in 
committee, but the session ended with Davis lacking authorization to 
suspend habeas corpus.443 
When Congress reassembled in December 1863, a group of House 
members passed a bill providing for a committee to inquire whether there 
had been any intentional violations of the constitutional rights of citizens of 
the Confederacy by military authorities in the period when Congress had 
                                                                                                                 
 437. See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 401–02 (describing Congress’s inaction on bills 
introduced to extend the authorization to suspend the writ of habeas corpus). 
 438. Id. at 402. 
 439. Id. 
 440. See 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 7 
(documenting the introduction of a bill entitled "An act to continue in force an act 
authorizing the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, approved October thirteenth, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-two" and its referral to the Committee on the Judiciary).  The 
discussion of the bill and the ultimate decision to refer it to the Committee on the Judiciary 
instead of voting on it is reported later in the journal.  See ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 352 
(reprinting the motion in full). 
 441. See id. at 75 (reporting the House resolution "[t]hat the President be requested to 
communicate to this House a list of all civilians now in custody under authority of the War 
Department, giving . . . the offense charged against him, and the place of his 
imprisonment"). 
 442. The bill was entitled "An act to declare that martial law can not exist within the 
Confederate States, and prescribing a penalty for declaring the same." 
 443. Id. at 427. 
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been in recess.444  Most of the members of the committee expressed their 
opposition to suspension and military control of civilians.  Although the 
committee never issued a report, the action revealed that elements in 
Congress had become increasingly restive about the exercise of powers by 
members of the Confederate armed forces.  
Concerned about the increased number of habeas petitions that had 
surfaced since Congress declined to renew his suspension authority, Davis 
submitted a message on February 3, 1864 to Congress, meeting in a secret 
session, asking that his suspension powers be renewed.  In the message he 
referred to "citizens of well-known disloyalty" who were "holding frequent 
communication with [the enemy], and furnishing valuable information to 
our injury."445  He described suspension as "a duty [as important as the 
duty] to levy taxes for the support of the government."446 
After debating the matter, Congress gave Davis limited suspension 
authority in a designated class of cases involving war crimes.447  The 
authority was to expire on August 1, 1864.448  After Davis signed the bill on 
February 15, opposition to it mounted over the course of the year, with state 
legislators in Georgia, North Carolina, Mississippi, and Alabama publicly 
criticizing it.449  After Davis delivered another address in November 1864 
warning of the breakdown in authority in Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee, where habeas petitions were once again interfering with the 
efforts of military authorities, the House supplied another limited 
suspension bill, which was reported out in December 1864.450  But the 
Senate amended the bill and delayed its being reported, and eventually, 
when the House passed an amended bill in March 1865, the Senate took no 
action.451  As a result, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not 
                                                                                                                 
 444. 6 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 516. 
 445. Id. at 744. 
 446. Id. at 746. 
 447. The full text of the Act of February 15, 1864 sheds more light on the types of war 
crimes for which the President could suspend the writ.  ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 408 
n.85. 
 448. Id. at 409. 
 449. See FRANK L. OWSLEY, STATE RIGHTS IN THE CONFEDERACY 176–202 (1925) 
(describing the aftermath of passage of the act as "one of the bitterest, and in some respects 
most disastrous, conflicts of the whole war between Confederate and state authorities," and 
then detailing the state reactions against the act’s passage).  
 450. See 7 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 269, for the 
text of the limited suspension bill.  The bill, approved by the House on December 10, 1864 
by a vote of fifty in favor and forty-four opposed, was then sent to the Senate.  Id. at 346–50. 
 451. 4 JOURNAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, supra note 197, at 723. 
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suspended anywhere within the Confederacy after August 1, 1864.  One 
historian has claimed that it is not coincidental that "1863—when there was 
no law to suspend the writ—was the turning of the tide against the 
Confederacy," and "that after August 1, 1864, when the last act suspending 
the writ had expired, the fortunes of the South never rose again."452 
As the war lengthened and Union armies moved deeper into the South, 
conflict developed between the military needs of the Confederacy and the 
interest of secessionist states in defending their own territory.  As early as 
1862 the Confederate high command had given priority to keeping Union 
troops away from Richmond, and had promoted occasional forays into the 
North in the hope of gaining leverage for peace negotiations.  This strategy 
meant that large numbers of troops were needed in Virginia, the base for 
both of those operations.  The best supply of troops for the Confederate 
army was state militias, but as more members of those militias were 
mustered into Confederate regiments, fewer soldiers were available to 
defend home states.  When members of state militias, for a variety of 
reasons, did not respond to conscription orders, one option for Confederate 
commanders was to arrest them for resisting the orders.  Suspensions of the 
writ of habeas corpus facilitated those arrests. 
In addition to concerns about the potential for government to trespass 
on the rights of states, members of the Confederate Congress were worried 
about the potential for suspensions to undermine the defense of their own 
localities.  When the Vice President of the Confederacy, Alexander 
Stephens of Georgia, gave a speech to the Georgia legislature protesting 
against the renewal of Davis’s suspension power in March 1864, he was not 
simply seeking to undermine Davis’s presidency or to declare his 
commitment to states’ rights.453  Along with the governor of Georgia, he 
was attempting to protect his state from the anticipated invasion of 
Sherman’s army, which at the time was entrenched near Atlanta. 
                                                                                                                 
 452. OWSLEY, supra note 449, at 202.  That claim seems exaggerated. If one assumes 
that the principal benefit gained by the Union and Confederate governments from 
suspending habeas corpus was the ability to detain persons suspected of being disloyal to 
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secession and war in those states at the outset of the war, it seems more likely that the 
diminished commitment to the war effort among residents of the Confederacy after 1863 
was a product of war weariness and a sense of foreboding about the eventual outcome of the 
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the war weary, or improved Confederate military resistance to invading Union armies. 
 453. ROBINSON, supra note 281, at 412. 
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There was thus a dimension in southern resistance to the suspension of 
habeas corpus that did not, for the most part, occur in northern states.  
Habeas corpus suspensions were undertaken, in both the Union and the 
Confederacy, for two main reasons.  One, as illustrated by Lincoln’s 1861 
suspensions in Maryland and Davis’s 1862 suspensions in eastern and 
central Virginia, was concern about sabotage in connection with possible 
military invasions by enemy forces.  The other was concern about 
resistance to military recruitment.  Generally, the states of the Union and 
the Confederacy were situated differently with respect to the latter issue.  
Military recruitment was a difficult matter for both the North and the South, 
and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus facilitated the enforcement of 
recruiting orders by allowing military authorities to arrest and detain 
persons who resisted the orders.  But in the North the recruitment of 
members of state militias or other residents of northern states into the Union 
army did not, for the most part, deprive those states of men who might 
defend their families and property from enemy attack.454  For the most part, 
those in the North who denounced habeas suspensions or openly resisted a 
military draft were not anticipating an imminent invasion of their localities.  
In the South that possibility was present for the entire duration of the war. 
B.  Conscription 
A close look at the situations in which habeas corpus suspensions 
occurred during the Civil War suggests that the issue of suspending the 
privilege of the writ cannot be readily separated from another issue, that of 
compulsory military recruitment.  The Civil War was the first in American 
history in which a longstanding tradition of voluntary military service was 
formally modified.455  "Voluntary" military service had been something of a 
misnomer, but legislation authorizing the national government to force 
eligible recruits to join the military services, which both the Confederacy 
and the Union government instituted during the course of the war, was 
unprecedented.456 
                                                                                                                 
 454. Only three battles took place in the border states, and only one, Gettysburg, was in 
a state north of the border states.  See CURT JOHNSON & MARK MCLAUGHLIN, CIVIL WAR 
BATTLES 6–7 (1977) (listing and depicting the location of battles). 
 455. See William L. Shaw, Selective Service:  A Source of Military Manpower, 13 MIL. 
L. REV. 35, 40–46 (1961) (comparing the efforts to raise armies in the Revolutionary War 
with those of the Union and Confederacy in the Civil War). 
 456. See id. (explaining that able-bodied men served during the Revolutionary War 
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The advent of conscripted military service in the Civil War needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of that "voluntary" tradition.  The tradition 
was a product of independence and the Revolutionary War experience.457  
All the colonies that became independent states in 1776 had militias, which 
were created by acts of assemblies and commanded by governors.  Militias 
typically included all able-bodied male residents of the colony or state that 
were within the ages of eighteen and forty-five.458  Not all those residents 
actually served in militias, and militias were active infrequently.459  The 
concept of a militia, however, presupposed that men eligible to serve in 
them were "on call" to be activated in emergencies.460 
When the Continental Congress sought to establish an army after it 
declared independence from Great Britain, it imposed quotas for soldiers 
from each of the states based on population.461  The states responded in 
various ways, but each drew on militia companies, offering their members 
bounties—typically in the form of cash payments, but sometimes in the 
form of warrants to tracts of land—if they volunteered to join the 
Continental Army.462  If not enough members volunteered, lotteries were 
held in some companies, and those chosen had the option of serving or 
providing substitutes.463  Buying or otherwise providing substitutes was, 
from the beginning, a feature of militia or federal army service in America. 
The Continental Army did its own recruiting, which consisted of 
creating two classes of volunteer soldiers.464  One joined the army as 
                                                                                                                 
individual colonies, while both the Union and the Confederacy passed federal legislation 
enforcing conscription). 
 457. See id. at 41 (quoting George Washington as saying "that every citizen who enjoys 
the protection of a free government, owes . . . [a portion] of his personal services to the 
defense of it"). 
 458. See id. at 40–41 (describing the state laws requiring militia service for able-bodied 
males in Virginia, Massachusetts, and Connecticut). 
 459. See id. at 41 (stating that although Virginia, for example, "could issue quotas for 
drafts during the Revolution, the colony did not" exercise that option). 
 460. Id. at 40. 
 461. See Jeffrey R. Hummel, The American Militia and the Origin of Conscription: A 
Reassessment, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD., no. 4, 2001, at 29, 36–39 (surveying the process by 
which the colonies and the Continental Congress raised armies, including a quota imposed 
by the Congress on the states). 
 462. See id. at 36 ("The Continental Army, the military force of the new national 
government, was initially composed entirely of volunteers.  But, as the war dragged on, 
manpower shortages became acute, despite the monetary bounties and land grants offered by 
both the Continental Congress and the individual states."). 
 463. Id. 
 464. See id. at 34 ("Alongside the common militia . . . was what came to be called the 
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professional soldiers, remaining for indefinite durations.  The other joined 
as volunteers for limited periods of enlistment.  This process was retained 
after the Revolutionary War ended, so that in ordinary times the federal 
army was staffed by volunteers, but when emergencies developed the state 
militias, normally under state control, could be called into service by the 
federal government and become part of a federal army.  The Constitution 
gave Congress the power "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to 
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions."465  The Constitution also gave the President power to serve as 
"Commander in Chief of . . . the Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United States."466  In 1795, Congress 
authorized the President to employ the militia of the several states when 
"combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of 
judicial proceedings" threatened "the laws of the United States."467  Unless 
individual members of state militias volunteered for longer periods of 
service, it was expected that they would not serve as part of the federal 
armed forces for more than three months.468 
After relying on volunteers and call-ups from state militias during the 
first year of the war, the Confederate Congress moved toward conscription 
more quickly than its Union counterpart.469  That decision was a response to 
the short recruitments, many of them for no longer than a year, which 
characterized the first group of Confederate volunteers after Sumter.470  It 
was also a response to the dire military situation that the Confederacy 
appeared to be facing in 1862—New Orleans was about to be captured; 
Union forces were advancing southward in Tennessee; the Army of the 
Potomac had established itself on the Yorktown Peninsula and was 
advancing toward Richmond; and Union armies had gained control of 
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 465. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 466. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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 468. See Hummel, supra note 461, at 32 ("Colonial governments were not supposed to 
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major rivers in the West.471  The prospect of having large numbers of troops 
leaving service after their one-year voluntary enlistments expired, coupled 
with a rapidly decreasing supply of volunteers, had prompted the 
Confederate Congress, as early as December 1861, to issue bounties and 
temporary furloughs for men who would re-enlist when their initial 
commissions expired.472  By the spring of 1862 the new Congress resolved 
to move from voluntary recruitment to conscription.473   
In a message on March 28, 1862, Davis argued that a system of 
conscription would result in longer enlistments, a more uniform and 
centralized military system, and a more equal distribution of the war’s 
burdens.474  Congress, sensitive to the forthcoming expiration in May of the 
enlistments of soldiers from 148 regiments who had signed up for twelve 
months, voted by approximately two to one to make all able-bodied white 
male citizens of seceded states between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five 
available for three years of military service.475  The legislation extended the 
terms of one-year volunteers to three years.  The process of administering 
the draft was similar to that in the Union.  The Confederate Secretary of 
War was in charge of enrolling persons for the draft and establishing quotas 
for states.476  "Camps of instruction" were established in each state, to 
which persons identified as eligible reported, were processed, and 
eventually, if admitted into the service, trained.477  
The first concerns of those who voted for conscription in the 
Confederacy were with extending the one-year enlistments of the first 
volunteers to three years before they expired, and with encouraging 
additional volunteers.  Volunteering did increase after the passage of the 
act, spurred in part by a policy of allowing existing companies of volunteers 
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to reorganize themselves for thirty days after conscription went into 
effect.478  That meant that those eligible to be drafted had thirty days to join 
regiments and participate in the election of officers in those regiments, as 
opposed to being randomly assigned to companies by conscription 
officials.479  In the year that conscription went into effect, approximately 
200,000 men joined the Confederate army, more than half of whom were 
volunteers.480 
From the outset, conscription in the Confederacy included exemptions 
for various classes of persons, including those who bought substitutes.481  
The exemptions were both controversial and a basis for manipulating the 
system.482  The practice of substitution had been followed in the first stages 
of the war, both with respect to volunteers and militia call-ups.483  It was 
retained in the 1862 conscription legislation.484  Substitutes needed to be 
lawfully exempt from military duty and fit for service,485 and efforts were 
made to limit the number of substitutes in each regiment.486  Those 
guidelines were difficult to enforce, and the system became susceptible to 
fraud.  Moreover, there was no option of commuting service through a 
payment to the Confederate government, as there was in the North, so the 
market price for substitutes quickly rose, reaching as high as $6,000 by 
1863.487  In the fall of 1862, Confederate Secretary of War, George 
Randolph informed Congress that "the evils of the [substitution] system 
[were] . . . very great,"488 and shortly thereafter it raised the age limit for 
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service to forty-five, thereby making men between the ages of thirty-five 
and forty-five eligible for the draft and disqualifying them as substitutes for 
the persons who had hired them. 
That change had very little impact, and by the time Congress met for 
its winter session in December 1863, demands to abolish substitution came 
from many corners.489  Congress eventually abolished substitution in late 
December, and made all persons who had furnished substitutes eligible for 
service in accompanying legislation in early January 1864.490  Several 
persons who had hired substitutes challenged the constitutionality of the 
legislation, claiming that it interfered with the obligation of contracts they 
had made prior to the legislation’s passage.491  A few lower state courts 
agreed, but the highest courts of the states upheld it.492  In one instance, 
however, Chief Justice Richmond Pearson of the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, sitting in chambers, declared the legislation abolishing 
substitution unconstitutional and proceeded to exempt persons who had 
challenged the legislation from military service.493  Davis responded by 
asking Congress to suspend habeas corpus,494 which Congress did in 
February 1864,495 and in June of that year the North Carolina Supreme 
Court, with Pearson dissenting, upheld the constitutionality of the abolition 
act.496  
Substitution was the most unpopular of all the exemptions from 
conscripted military service, but all of them raised concerns.  Unlike 
substitution, which Congress eventually came to deplore, the policy of 
exempting several categories of persons from the draft was consistently 
reflected in conscription legislation, with the only major issue being 
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whether Congress should create categorical exceptions or the executive 
should have discretion to create them on a piecemeal basis.497 
The list of exempted persons included officers of the Confederate and 
state governments, ministers, printers, college professors and teachers with 
more than twenty pupils, druggists, hospital attendants, and workers in 
mines, foundries, wool and cotton factories, and members of state 
militias.498  In addition, "aliens" were exempted, that category being defined 
to include residents who had not become domiciled in a particular 
locality.499  Almost all of those categories were stretched by potential 
draftees and officials to enable persons to avoid military service, and when 
Congress increased the categories of exempted persons in October 1862, 
evasions also increased.500  
Confederate policymakers were well aware that creating class-based 
exemptions, administered by a central government, on a matter as 
fundamental as compulsory military service would provoke the sorts of 
resentments that surfaced in the wake of conscription.  But they were faced 
with a practical difficulty:  The Union blockade threatened the already low 
levels of manufacturing and industrial activity in the Confederate states.  To 
meet basic demands of war, agricultural households needed to be 
encouraged to produce goods to service larger populations, railroads needed 
to be maintained; factories needed to be encouraged to develop; and 
industrial production needed to be jump-started.  Failure to exempt classes 
of persons with skills that could be used in industrial production and the 
supply of goods for the war effort would adversely affect the Confederate 
war apparatus.501  Thus the legislation exempted miners, manufacturers, 
tanners, shoemakers, salt producers, millers, railroad workers, blacksmiths, 
wagon-makers, foundry workers, and carpenters.502  
White men operating as overseers on plantations with at least twenty 
slaves were also exempted.  This exemption, which allowed one white 
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overseer on each plantation to avoid military service, was the most 
controversial exempted class provided for by the Confederate Congress.  
On its face, the exemption was an apparent effort to favor planters over 
farmers who owned no slaves.  The exemption’s "influence upon the poor," 
one member of Congress wrote to Davis in December 1862, "is most 
calamitous, and has awakened a spirit and elicited a discussion of which we 
may safely predicate the most unfortunate results."503  Congress 
subsequently modified the exemption, but never abolished it. 
Over the course of the war increased pressure was placed on 
exemptions, and Congress began to clash with Davis over them.504  
Congress had delegated the administration of exemptions to Davis and the 
War Department, and in doubtful cases exemptions were given until 
Congress clarified the matter.505  This resulted in some abuses, and 
Congress initially responded, in October 1862, by increasing the number of 
exempted categories.506  The Secretary of War continued, however, to 
engage in the practice of "detailing," or assigning persons enrolled in the 
draft to skilled labor jobs that would service the war effort but did not 
involve combat.  By the fall of 1863 the number of "detailed" persons had 
grown so large that the Confederate Bureau of Conscription estimated that 
they amounted to fifty percent of the draftees in Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Georgia.507 
In a December 1863 message to Congress, Davis responded by 
proposing that exemption categories be abolished, that all persons eligible 
for the draft be enrolled in the military, and that the executive branch be 
given authority to detail persons in war-related industries.  In addition, he 
proposed creating "collateral" ranks of servicemen who were not fit for 
field duty, including slaves.508 
Congress responded by modifying the conscription system in February 
1864, but not along the lines Davis recommended.509  It made the required 
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term of years for "all white men, residents of the Confederate States, 
between the ages of seventeen and fifty" the duration of the war, abolishing 
term enlistments.510  It also reduced the number of exempted classes and 
gave the executive branch authority to detail into productive non-military 
occupations only those persons in exempted categories.511  Details were to 
come, presumptively, from the ranks of men deemed not fit for field 
service.512  
The measure was designed to increase the ranks of soldiers and at the 
same time permit the use of persons eligible for the draft, but not fit for 
combat, in military-related occupations.  It did not work well in practice 
because it transferred the critical decision of determining military status to 
local boards of eligibility, which would make the initial decision as to 
whether a draftee was fit for combat.513  Detailing only came into play once 
that decision was made.  Those discretionary elements of the enrolling 
process, and the fact that reducing the number of exempt categories 
increased the number of persons between eighteen and fifty who needed to 
be processed, resulted in pressures of various kinds on the eligibility 
boards.514  Since service for a state or the Confederacy remained an 
exempted category, the governors of some states certified large numbers of 
persons as necessary for the administration of state affairs.515  In addition, a 
significant number of persons managed to get physical exemptions from 
eligibility boards by obtaining certificates of disability from local 
physicians.516  As the administration of the new system unrolled, the 
military prospects of the Confederacy deteriorated, resulting in more 
draftees wanting to be placed in the non-combatant ranks of the service or 
to avoid service altogether. 
In this atmosphere Davis and Congress clashed over conscription 
policy.  Both agreed that given the Confederacy’s troubled military 
situation, as many eligible men as possible needed to be funneled into 
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active field service.517  Whereas Davis believed that the way to achieve that 
was to retain the practice of detailing, but abolish categorical exemptions,518 
the House Committee on Military Affairs stated that "experience has 
demonstrated that the power of detail as heretofore exercised has afforded 
more unnecessary immunity from military service than the well-guarded 
legislation upon the subject of exemptions."519  At the same time a 
committee of the Senate reported that executive branch detailing had 
exempted over 22,000 men in states east of the Mississippi, and proposed 
removing the Davis administration’s discretionary detail power.520  
On March 11, 1865, Congress passed a bill reestablishing class-based 
exemptions and revoking most of the Davis administration’s authority to 
detail draftees for non-military service.521  Davis vetoed the bill on the 
ground that it would "throw the whole machinery of the government into 
confusion and disorder," and asked Congress to propose amendments.522  At 
the same time he called for "[a] law of a few lines repealing all class 
exemptions."523  Congress responded only by eliminating an exemption for 
mechanics and artisans and altering the procedure for medical 
examinations.524  When the war ended two months later, the initial system 
of categorical exemptions to conscription had been largely restored. 
Of all the measures the Confederate Congress passed, conscription was 
the least popular.  The reasons for this unpopularity revealed much about 
the tenor of life in secessionist states during the Civil War.525  By being a 
universal measure imposed by a central government, conscription brought 
to the surface conflicts among regions and classes in the South that the 
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widespread enthusiasm for secession and the initially favorable response to 
the prospect of war against the North had concealed.526  Conscription was, 
above all, an effort by a government based in Richmond to compel young 
men all over the Confederacy to expose their lives in battle.527  Some of 
those men lived in regions that did not have a high percentage of slaves, 
and thus found the preservation of a slave-owning economy less 
imperative.528  Others resided in states whose officials believed that the 
appropriate unit for staffing and fighting a war was the state government.529  
Others resented the exemptions to draft eligibility, believing that they 
favored the wealthy classes or various interest groups.530  Still others simply 
did not want to serve in the military.531 
Once the Confederate Congress resolved to substitute conscription for 
a voluntary, state-run system of staffing the military, it ensured that 
policymakers in Richmond would be making decisions on who, in localities 
across the Confederacy, would be going to war.532  On the one hand, that 
form of centralization, as Davis pointed out, seemed necessary to 
coordinate a collective military effort and to ensure a rough equality of 
participation among residents of secessionist states.533  On the other hand, it 
ran counter to the localist, individualist thrust of attitudes in the antebellum 
South.534  Moreover, it seemed inconsistent with a principle many 
secessionists had identified with their decision to leave the Union:  That it 
was intolerable for a national government to tell citizens of states how to 
conduct their lives.535  And as the war unfurled, the policy of conscription 
in the Confederacy suffered from a double disadvantage:  It was not only 
being imposed on states and localities from Richmond, it was forcing young 
men to participate in military operations whose danger was apparent and 
whose prospect of success was diminishing.536  
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The Confederacy arguably needed many of its categorical exceptions 
to conscription in order to create incentives for members of its population to 
work in jobs necessary to the war effort.537  Even some of the categories 
that seemed to reinforce existing status hierarchies, such as the exception 
for overseers on plantations with over twenty slaves, could be seen as 
connected to war production.538  If one made the assumption that 
plantations produced more excess food and goods for soldiers if the slave 
labor on them was supervised by overseers, exempting overseers who 
supervised twenty or more slaves arguably contributed to the war effort.539  
The Confederacy needed to create defense industries in a hurry.540  Its 
categorical exemptions to conscription were seen as a way of doing that, 
and arguably they succeeded.541  One commentator concluded that the 
Confederacy’s Ordinance Bureau, which was charged with stimulating the 
manufacture of war supplies by private businesses throughout the South, 
"achieved phenomenal results in the conversion of an agricultural economy 
to some semblance of adequate war production by industry."542 
Even though the constitutionality of conscription legislation was not a 
major issue in the  Confederacy,543 the advent of a universal draft was 
nonetheless a defining marker of American culture during the Civil War.  
Standing armies were anathema to the Revolutionary and framing 
generations.544  Volunteers had fought previous wars, and in peacetime the 
regular army and navy had been kept small in size and maintained by 
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professional soldiers.545  Before the Civil War there was not only no 
tradition of universal military service, there was a tradition of sharply 
separating the military from the rest of the population.546  
After Union efforts to invade Richmond and Confederate efforts to 
surround Washington failed in the early years of the war, it became 
apparent to both sides that the conflict would not be limited to "quick 
strikes," and that peace negotiations would not occur unless one side 
showed a decisive advantage.547  The war was going to consist of long, 
casualty-ridden campaigns through large stretches of territory, and civilians 
as well as soldiers were going to be involved.548  The Confederate 
Conscription Act of 1862 anticipated the regulation and taking of property 
as well as the compulsory enlistment of men in military service, although 
Congress failed to enact price control provisions.549  By 1863, something 
like "total war," in which the destruction of persons and property was not 
confined to battlefields, had emerged.550  With its vastly increased 
commitment of men and resources, total war required the constant 
replenishing of the soldier population on both sides.551  Conscription, 
therefore, was one of the symbols of total war. 
The close connections between conscription, the suspension of habeas 
corpus, and the imposition of martial law can serve as reminders of the total 
war dimensions of a universal draft.  After the government initially declared 
martial law and suspended habeas corpus (both instituted as defensive 
measures in the face of perceived threats to the Union and Confederate 
capitals), later impositions of martial law or the suspension of habeas 
corpus (in both Union and Confederate territory) tended to occur when 
policymakers confronted problems with the administration of the draft 
against the backdrop of what they perceived as a perilous military situation.  
Both the suspension of habeas corpus and the imposition of martial law in 
those situations were reminders that the logic of total war could lead to 
military control of civilian populations.  A universal draft was a signal that 
a climate of total war had appeared.  These defensive measures were further 
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signals that in such a climate, if military needs were not being met, the 
military itself might be given authority to ensure that they would be.  Thus 
it is possible to see conscription legislation and proclamations suspending 
habeas corpus and imposing martial law as a collection of interrelated 
governmental activities in a climate of total war.  That climate was 
unprecedented in the experience of Americans, and in that sense the Civil 
War was a decisive turning point in American history, and the first episode 
in which American citizens, on both sides of the conflict, felt the presence 
of an expansive federal state. 
V.  Conclusion 
After the Civil War concluded, commentators likened it to the 
medieval practice of trial by battle.552  Under that practice, parties to private 
criminal or real property disputes could elect the option of a "wager of 
battle" in which the winner of a physical contest was deemed to have told 
the truth in the dispute.553  Trial by battle was in wide use in England from 
the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, and persisted in a limited 
fashion until the early nineteenth century.554  It rested on the assumption 
that since legal proceedings were designed to carry out God’s will, and God 
knew which person was telling the truth in disputes, God would have given 
the party who won the ordeal sufficient strength to prevail.555  
Although that assumption may have been alien to many mid 
nineteenth-century Americans, a reconstituted version of it was not.  In that 
version victors in war won because their cause had been noble and just, so a 
decision to settle a conflict in battle was an effort to vindicate the honor of 
the combatants.  We have seen that many Southerners embraced secession 
because they believed that they needed to defend their individual liberties 
and their way of life.556  Many Northerners volunteered for the Union army 
because they wanted to defend the United States government against those 
                                                                                                                 
 552. See, e.g., Cynthia Nicoletti, The American Civil War as Trial by Battle, 28 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 71, 77 (2010) (noting that nineteenth-century intellectuals in America 
characterized the Civil War as a "trial by battle"). 
 553. Id. 
 554. Id. at 77–78 (citing ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER:  THE 
MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 103–26 (1986)). 
 555. Id. at 82. 
 556. CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLICT, supra note 405, at 13; MCPHERSON, WHAT THEY 
FOUGHT FOR, supra note 95, at 27. 
RECOVERING THE LEGAL HISTORY 553 
who sought to undermine it.557  So long as neither side was prepared to 
accept the others’ views on slavery and secession, ordeal by battle was 
another option.  Moreover, a resolution of at least one of the incompatible 
issues in which the honor of both sides seemed at stake, the "right" of 
secession, would be mandated by the war.  
In their discussions of the war as a trial by battle, some northern 
commentators argued that the secessionist states, by starting the war, had 
demanded a trial by battle, and had failed since their cause was flawed.558  
Some commentators from the South were unrepentant on the theoretical 
legitimacy of secession, but conceded that since the Confederacy had lost 
the battle, the doctrine of secession had now been repudiated.559  Some, on 
both sides, used the trial by battle analogy to suggest that the "ultimate 
ratio," force, had prevailed once legal conflict had become irreconcilable.560  
Others believed that former Confederates would never become reconciled 
to rejoining the Union unless they could rationally be persuaded as to the 
folly of the argument for secession.561  
The widespread use by nineteenth-century commentators of the legal 
trial by battle analogy in describing the outcome of the Civil War suggests 
that they perceived that the war had been a transformative event in the legal 
history of America.  An extended phase in that history had suddenly come 
to a conclusion with the end of the war, and it was possible to see the 
dissolution of the Union, and the creation of the Confederacy that 
accompanied it, as the last stages in that phase. 
The phase had included a secession from the British Empire and the 
articulation of republican theories of sovereignty on which that secession 
rested.  It had encompassed the creation of a federal union of former British 
colonies to promote unity among those involved in the secession; the 
astounding physical and economic growth of that union; the increasingly 
disintegrative effects of that growth; and, in an ironic culmination, another 
episode in secession.  Deep cultural commitments to individual liberty and 
resistance to governmental authority, taken to be uniquely American credos 
that helped define the laws as well as the mores of a new nation, had 
interacted with two other unique themes of colonial, Revolutionary, and 
antebellum America:  The displacement of Amerindian natives and the 
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enslavement of transported Africans and their descendants.  By 1860, that 
interaction had put extreme pressure on the major American legal 
institutions, resulting in the dissolution of the Union.  By 1865, the Union 
was on the cusp of restoration, but it could not resemble its predecessor.  A 
finding that secession violated the Constitution of the United States was a 
way of relegating the government of the Confederacy to the American past, 
and thereby confining it to oblivion.  
